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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2015, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) use of
various social media tools in a rulemaking under the Clean Water
Act violated prohibitions in federal appropriations laws against publicity, propaganda, and lobbying. 1 Although academics previously explored whether the use of technology in rulemaking might violate the
∗ Walter F. George Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law.
1. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-B-326944, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY—APPLICATION OF PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA AND ANTI-LOBBYING PROVISIONS
(2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674163.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9DC-LPL8] [hereinafter GAO Report].
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Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 2 the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 3 or the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 4 none predicted that
one of the first firestorms surrounding the use of social media in
rulemaking would arise out of federal appropriations laws.5
While critics of the EPA Waters of the United States (WOTUS)
rule 6 vigorously chastised the agency for its ‘illegal activity,’ 7 a close
reading of the GAO report indicates that the agency’s violations of appropriations rules were relatively minor and could be easily avoided in
the future.8 Despite the outcry in the wake of the report, an analysis of
the appropriations legislation demonstrates that it poses very few restrictions, in practice, on agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking.9
However, an analysis of the WOTUS rulemaking and the manner
in which EPA used social media in the rulemaking demonstrates that
agencies may decide to use social media in rulemaking for a variety
of reasons, some of which are more legally defensible than others.
Proponents of the use of social media in rulemaking tout its potential
for educating the public, gathering more information from a broader
range of participants, and developing better, more democratic, and
more widely accepted rules.10 Through its Regulation Room project,
Cornell University’s eRulemaking Initiative has partnered with various federal agencies to demonstrate effective, though resourceintensive, ways to use technology and social media to meet those

2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596 (2012).
3. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2012).
4. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012)).
5. See, e.g., Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
893 (2011); Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011); Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a Vision for
Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 78
(2013) [hereinafter Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects]; Keith W. Rizzardi, Why Don’t

FACA Committees Like Facebook? Social Media, Public Input, and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 75 (2014).

6. The rule that sparked the controversy was a rule adopted by EPA under the Clean
Water Act to define the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” under the statute. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015).
7. See, e.g., Rich Edson, EPA Under Fire for Social Media ‘PR Campaign’ Pushing
Water Regs, FOXNEWS.COM, (May 26, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/05/26/
epa-under-fire-for-social-media-pr-campaign-pushing-water-regs.html
[https://perma.cc/4CY4-RKER]; Eric Lipton & Coral Davenport, Critics Hear E.P.A.’s Voice
in ‘Public Comments’, N.Y. TIMES, (May 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/us/
critics-hear-epas-voice-in-public-comments.html [hereinafter Lipton & Davenport, Critics].
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part I.
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goals. 11 However, an agency might also be tempted to use social media tools in the rulemaking process to evangelize, rather than educate, and to contour information (selectively promote the submission
of information to support a predetermined outcome). While EPA did
not cross that line in the WOTUS rulemaking, when an agency uses
social media to evangelize and contour information, it can run afoul
not only of prohibitions in appropriations laws, but also of requirements of the APA. 12 Although the violation of appropriations laws
would only trigger minor sanctions, violation of the APA requirements could trigger invalidation of the agency rule. 13
Further, when an agency uses social media to evangelize and contour information, the public (or certain segments of the public) may
feel that the agency is merely using the rulemaking process as a tool
to build public support and a judicially defensible record for an outcome that was determined before the agency sought public input. In
those cases, the agency risks sacrificing all of the benefits that are
normally associated with public participation in a transparent, open
rulemaking process, including public support and acceptance for the
final rule, ease of enforcement, and reduced judicial challenges.14 In
an attempt to develop public support, the agency might actually
spark hostility and increase the likelihood of a challenge to its rules.
As the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
recently recommended, therefore, agencies should think carefully
about what legitimate goals they expect to achieve through the use of
social media in rulemaking before embarking on rulemaking and develop a strategy for using social media tools in a manner that best
achieves those legitimate goals.15
This Article examines the benefits of using social media in rulemaking, the limitations imposed on the use of social media by appropriations laws and the APA, and the practical considerations involved in choosing the right mix of social media tools for rulemaking.
Part I of the Article outlines the various goals that agencies might
11. CORNELL UNIV., CeRI: Cornell eRulemaking Initiative, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/
ceri/ [https://perma.cc/45BS-596M]; see also Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra
note 5, at 107-12. Students and faculty from Cornell work with federal agencies and use a
variety of tools beyond those used by most agencies in the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process to expand the universe of persons participating in the rulemaking process, educate
the public about the process and the issues involved in a proposed rule, and improve the
quality of public comments on rules. Id.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
15. See Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendation 2013-5:
Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269, 76,271 (Dec. 17, 2013) (adopted Dec. 5,
2013; not published in the C.F.R.) [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 2013-5].
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have when choosing to use social media tools in rulemaking. Part II
explores the variety of social media tools that are available to agencies and provides a brief overview of federal support for the use of
those tools in rulemaking. Part III examines the extent to which social media tools can actually achieve the goals that motivate agencies
to use them. Part IV outlines the limits imposed on agencies’ use of
social media by appropriations laws, and Part V outlines the APA
challenges that might be raised if agencies use social media to evangelize and contour information in the rulemaking process. Finally,
Part VI provides some concluding suggestions regarding the appropriate use of social media tools in rulemaking.
II. WHY AGENCIES MIGHT USE SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING
As the federal government embraced e-Rulemaking at the beginning of this century, proponents extolled the benefits of using technology to create better, more defensible, and more widely accepted
rules through a more democratic and transparent process. 16 While
early e-Rulemaking efforts have not yet revolutionized the rulemaking process in the manner that supporters hoped they would,17 advocates for the increased use of social media in rulemaking tout many
of the same potential benefits for those tools. Supporters argue that
the effective use of social media tools can involve broader and more
diverse segments of the public in the development of rules,18 educate
the public about proposed rules and the rulemaking process so that
they can provide better input into that process, 19 change the nature
of public participation in the rulemaking process to create opportunities for dialogue and interaction between commenters, 20 and increase
the transparency of the rulemaking process.21 All of those benefits
may be possible when the tools are used by an agency that enters the
16. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation
and Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 898-99 (2006); Dooling, supra note 5, at 896;
Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 92-94; Stephen M. Johnson, The
Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 304 (1998); Jeffrey S.
Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rulemakers’ Attitudes About E-Rulemaking, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 453-54 (2010); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in
Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 473-74 (2004).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See MICHAEL HERZ, USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING: POSSIBILITIES AND

BARRIERS, FINAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov.
21, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Herz%20Social%20Media%
20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP83-BDNW]; see also infra Part I.A.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. See infra Part I.D.
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rulemaking process with a genuine interest in receiving broad public
input and a willingness to make changes to the rule in ways that are
informed by that input.
However, social media tools can also be used by agencies for more
nefarious purposes. If an agency begins the rulemaking process with
a predetermined outcome in mind, hoping to use the process to cultivate public support for that outcome and to develop a judicially defensible record to support that outcome, an agency might use social
media tools in the rulemaking process to evangelize, rather than educate, and to contour information (promote the public submission of
information to support the agency’s desired outcome), rather than to
simply gather information. It is in those cases that agencies are most
likely to act in contravention of the APA or appropriations laws.22

A. Generating Broader Public Participation
Very few citizens participate in the traditional federal notice-andcomment rulemaking process. 23 In general, regulated entities, trade
associations, and professional organizations submit most of the comments on proposed rules, while regulatory beneficiaries and private
citizens are largely silent. 24 Thus, through the traditional rulemaking
process, agencies are frequently only hearing part of the story regarding the impacts of their rules. 25 Federal agencies recognize, however,
that social media tools like Facebook and Twitter can play an im22. See infra Parts IV and V.
23. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 386 (2011); Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78. Several studies examining rulemaking by different agencies at different times have found that fewer than thirty-five comments are provided by citizens on most proposed rules. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual
Suspects, supra note 5, at 82. The WOTUS rule that is the subject of this Article is an exception to that rule, but there have been other rulemakings in the past that have also generated significant public input. For instance, 250,000 comments were submitted for a 1997
rule addressing standards for organic products, and hundreds of thousands of comments
were submitted on the Federal Communications Commission’s rules on the concentration
of media ownership, an EPA rule regarding mercury emissions, and a Forest Service rule
banning construction of roads in wilderness areas. Id.
24. See Steven J. Balla & Benjamin M. Daniels, Information Technology and Public
Commenting on Agency Regulations, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 46 (2007); Cary Coglianese,
Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006);
Farina et al., supra note 23, at 386, 423; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note
5, at 78; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006). While public interest organizations provide comments on major rulemakings, they have limited resources,
so they must be judicious in deciding when to participate in the process. See Wendy E.
Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321,
1378-79 (2010).
25. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 5.
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portant role in broadening and diversifying participation in the rulemaking process.26 One of the greatest barriers to public participation
in the rulemaking process is the lack of public awareness that most
rulemakings are occurring. 27 Social media tools provide great promise
for reducing that barrier and spreading the word that government
agencies are seeking public input on important proposed rules or on
important issues prior to the development of proposed rules.28
Ideally, those tools could help agencies gather expert opinion from
sources other than the major regulated entities and trade associations that normally participate in the process. 29 They could help
agencies gather the local and situational knowledge about the concrete impacts of a proposed rule on communities, small businesses,
26. EPA’s Social Media Policy identifies “increased ability . . . to engage and collaborate with . . . the American public” as a major benefit of using social media. OFFICE OF
ENVTL. INFO., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CIO 2184.0, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 1,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/documents/social_media_policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WRF6-ETKP] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA
POLICY]. Similarly, the agency’s Facebook Guidance notes that Facebook “[a]llows [EPA] to
reach out to people who use Facebook but may not engage the government in more formal,
traditional ways.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA FACEBOOK GUIDANCE,
http://govsocmed.pbworks.com/w/page/27521304/EPA [https://perma.cc/4SE3-3H9H] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE]. In discussing Twitter, EPA
notes that “when followers ‘retweet’ . . . our message has the potential to spread far beyond
our own followers. . . . [I]t’s another channel beyond epa.gov where people gather, so we can reach a
broader audience with our existing messages.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA TWITTER
GUIDANCE, http://govsocmed.pbworks.com/w/page/27521294/EPA [https://perma.cc/67MF-UTUJ]
[hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE].
27. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 9, 32; Anne E. Boustead & Karlyn D. Stanley, The

Legal and Policy Road Ahead: An Analysis of Public Comments in NHTSA’s Vehicle-to-Vehicle Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 693,
706 (2015); Farina et al., supra note 23, at 385, 389-90; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 84. Prior to eRulemaking efforts, notice of proposed rulemaking was
often limited to publication in the Federal Register, which is not frequently read by average citizens. See Anne E. Boustead & Karlyn D. Stanley, The Legal and Policy Road

Ahead: An Analysis of Public Comments in NHTSA's Vehicle-to-Vehicle Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 693, 706 (2015). Even in the eRulemak-

ing era, few citizens spend much time following rules on Regulations.gov, although the site
allows users to sign up for e-mail alerts to track proposed rules or other regulatory actions.
See REGULATIONS.GOV, How to Use Regulations.gov, https://www.regulations.gov/#!help
[https://perma.cc/BM42-S5CR].
28. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32; see also infra Part III.A. However, increased public awareness about proposed rules, in and of itself, will not necessarily result in broader
and more diverse participation in the rulemaking process as there are other barriers to
participation and as individuals will frequently not be motivated to comment on rules unless the effects of the rule on them are great enough to justify the cost of participating in
the process. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 706.
29. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note
5, at 83. Professor Cynthia Farina and her colleagues believe that members of the public
will be motivated to share their expertise with agencies through web-based interactions in
rulemaking in the same way that they have donated their expertise to develop Wikipedia
or to help patent examiners identify prior art through the PeerToPatent project. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 424.
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and individuals that the agency frequently cannot access through the
traditional notice-and-comment process. 30 When an agency has access
to more complete information, it can identify and address issues that
it might not otherwise have considered adequately. 31 As a result, the
agency should be able to develop better rules in that they are more
rational and defensible than if they were developed without the benefit of the additional input. 32
Broader public participation has many other benefits. A broadly
inclusive process that is carried out in a transparent manner will be
viewed as a much more democratic process. 33 To the extent that participants in the process can better understand a rule and feel that the
rulemaking process was carried out in a manner that allowed them
to have their views heard and addressed, they should be less antagonistic towards the final rule.34 Ideally, they should be less likely to
challenge the rule and the rule should be easier to enforce. 35 Fewer
legal challenges and greater acceptance of rules should reduce costs
and resource demands for agencies, as litigation to defend rules and
to enforce rules against recalcitrant violators is time consuming and

30. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 424-26; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects,
supra note 5, at 83. “Local knowledge” is “the first-hand experience of those who deal directly with the objects and targets of rulemaking.” Farina et al., supra note 23, at 426. It is

the insight that a local sanitation engineer could provide to EPA about implementing
drinking water standards that the national trade organization for water treatment plants
might not be able to provide. See Cary Coglianese, Weak Democracy, Strong Information:
The Role of Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process, in GOVERNANCE AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: FROM ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT TO INFORMATION
GOVERNMENT 101, 117 (Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & David Lazer eds., 2007).
31. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 79; Stephen M. Johnson,
Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 702-03, 735 (2007); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 402 (2007).
32. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 706; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 83; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
P UBLIC P ARTICIPATION GUIDE 1, 5, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/
documents/ppg_english_full-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JS7-W79Y] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION GUIDE].
33. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2, 6; Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 702-03;
Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 80.
34. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5,
at 79-80.
35. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5,
at 79-80; David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision
Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 677-78
(2006); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
459 (2004); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION GUIDE, supra note
32, at 5. Conversely, as more persons participate in the rulemaking process, there are more
persons who might be disappointed with the outcome and who might, therefore, choose to
challenge the rule.
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expensive. 36 Similarly, the public can receive the benefits that rules
are designed to provide more quickly when the rules are not challenged and when the regulated community acts quickly to come into
compliance. Even if broader participation does not reduce challenges
to agencies’ rules, it provides the agencies with more information
about the level of public support for, or opposition to, rules as they
are being developed.37
Broader public participation can also be instrumental in reducing
opportunities for agency capture. 38 The traditional notice-andcomment process is dominated by a few major players,39 and empirical studies have demonstrated systemic biases in favor of regulated
entities in rulemakings where the public input is dominated by those
entities.40 Broader public participation can help counterbalance that
disproportionate input.

B. Educating the Public
While agencies might use social media tools to broaden and diversify the pool of participants in the rulemaking process, they might
also use them to educate the public about the rules for which they are
seeking public input and to educate the public about the rulemaking
36. Between 1998 and 2010, for instance, the Justice Department spent $46.9 million
just to defend EPA in lawsuits challenging its rules. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-15-803T, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: INFORMATION ON CASES AGAINST EPA AND FWS
AND ON DEADLINE SUITS ON EPA RULEMAKING (2015), http://gao.gov/assets/680/671846.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3V6Y-PXTT].
37. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 428-29; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects,
supra note 5, at 80.
38. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78. Agency capture
occurs “when organized groups successfully act to vindicate their interests through government policy at the expense of the public interest.” Michael A. Livermore & Richard L.
Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1343 (2013).
Academics frequently cite broad participation in a transparent process as a safeguard
against regulatory capture. Id. at 1356; see also STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 293 (2008); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term: Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59 (1998).
39. The process tends to be dominated by a small number of regulated entities, industry trade associations, and, to a lesser extent, non-governmental organizations. See supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 4-5. Even when an
agency isn’t “capture[d],” it tends to reach out more frequently to regulated entities than to
regulatory beneficiaries for input in policy development because (1) the agency directly
interacts with regulated entities, so it knows their identities, while it may not know the
identities of regulatory beneficiaries; (2) the agency is interested in maintaining a good
long-term relationship with regulated entities; and (3) regulatory entities are more likely to
have information about a policy’s costs and feasibility than regulatory beneficiaries or the
agency itself. See Mendelson, supra note 31, at 429-30.
40. See Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s
Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 108-09 (2011).
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process itself. 41 Education can address some of the major barriers to
broader public participation in the rulemaking process. Although
rulemakings frequently have significant impacts on the public, citizens often do not participate in the process because the issues involved in the rulemaking and the language of the rulemaking (often
written on a graduate school reading level) are complex, technical,
and difficult to understand. 42 The volume of information that someone
may need to review in order to provide effective comments on a rule
may be staggering, leading to information overload.43 Further, citizens
may decline to provide comments on a rule because the technocratic
nature of the process leads them to believe that their comments will be
ignored or that they have nothing worthwhile to provide.44
Even when citizens provide comments on a proposed rule, their
comments may be less effective than comments provided by the regulated entities, trade associations, and non-governmental organizations because citizens don’t fully comprehend the manner in which
their input can or will be used by the agency in the rulemaking process.45 They may not understand that in most cases, rulemaking is
not a plebiscite, so that a simple expression of support for, or opposition to, a rule is not likely to have a significant impact on the formulation of the rule.46 Similarly, they may not understand that the
agency does not have the statutory authority to take an approach
that they are suggesting. 47 Consequently, they frequently submit
comments that address issues of values and policy; agencies generally
give those types of comments little weight, regardless of the volume of
comments in support of a specific value or policy. 48 By contrast, the
repeat players that dominate the notice-and-comment process often
address the scientific and technical issues that are central to the agency’s rule and provide data and analyses to support their comments.49
41. EPA stresses the educational value of social media tools in its Facebook Guidance
and Twitter Guidance. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE, supra note
26; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE, supra note 26.
42. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 385, 437-38. Describing the rules that the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative included in its Regulation Room pilot program to improve public participation through technology, Professor Farina observed that the notice of proposed
rulemaking for one of the Department of Transportation rules in the program was twentytwo pages long, written at a post-graduate reading level, and accompanied by a 107-page
regulatory impact analysis. Id. at 437-38.
43. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32; Farina, et al., supra note 23, at 389-90; Johnson,
Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 84-85.
44. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 84-86.
45. Id. at 85.
46. Id. at 85-86.
47. Id. at 89.
48. Id. at 88.
49. Id. at 87.
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“Agencies tend to give [those] comments significant weight” because
they understand that the repeat players are likely to challenge the final rule in court, and the rule will be invalidated if the agency does not
adequately address the issues raised in those comments.50
Many of the barriers to public participation in the rulemaking
process can be reduced through education. Agencies can take steps to
make the language of proposed rules and the documents supporting
the rules easier to understand, to summarize the issues involved in
the rulemaking more succinctly, and to educate the public about the
rulemaking process and the type of public comments that can be the
most helpful and effective. 51 Better educated and informed citizens
should provide better and more effective input, which should improve
the quality of the rules adopted by agencies. In addition, the education efforts by agencies should increase the volume of citizen participation in the rulemaking process.
Beyond those benefits, when citizens learn more about the rulemaking process and the issues involved in a rule, they will develop a
greater understanding of the rule and the reasoning behind the
rule.52 Ideally, this should lead to greater acceptance of rules which
will make them easier to enforce and less likely to be challenged. 53
In light of all of those benefits, it is not surprising that education
is central to the mission of many agencies. In the environmental arena, Congress recognized the need for greater public education when it
enacted the National Environmental Education Act, finding that
“[e]ffective response to complex environmental problems requires understanding of the natural and built environment, awareness of environmental problems and their origins . . . , and the skills to solve
those problems” and that “[c]urrent Federal efforts to inform and educate the public concerning the natural and built environment and
environmental problems are not adequate.” 54 The law imposes a duty
on EPA to address that deficiency and requires the agency to work
with schools, nongovernmental organizations, broadcasting entities,
and the private sector to develop programs and activities to improve
awareness of environmental problems. 55 It creates an Office of Envi50. Id.
51. Some of the tools used by the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative in its Regulation
Room to summarize the issues in proposed rules, make the rules more readable, and educate the public regarding the comment process and effective commenting are discussed in
Part IV of this Article.
52. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 6; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
GUIDE, supra note 32, at 5; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 79-80.
53. See sources cited supra note 52.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 5501(a)(4), (6) (2012).
55. § 5501(a)(8).
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ronmental Education within EPA, which is required to develop and
support programs and related efforts to improve the understanding of
the environment, develop and disseminate environmental education
materials, and otherwise provide for implementation of the law.56
The Federal Clean Water Act, pursuant to which EPA published the
WOTUS rule, emphasizes the importance of encouraging and assisting citizen participation in the development of rules under the law,57
and therefore, educating the public to facilitate that participation
falls comfortably within EPA’s responsibilities under the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Education Act.
It seems only natural that agencies, including EPA, might turn to
social media and other technologies to advance their educational mission because Congress enacted the E-Government Act of 2002 “[t]o
promote use of the Internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen participation in Government”
and “[t]o promote better informed decisionmaking by policy makers.” 58

C. Changing the Nature of Public Participation
While agencies might choose to use social media tools to broaden
citizen participation in rulemaking or to educate those citizens, they
might also use the tools to change the nature of public participation
in the rulemaking process. Traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking is frequently criticized because it does not provide an opportunity
for dialogue between the agency and commenters or between the
commenters.59 In the traditional process, comments are provided to
the agency during the notice period, and the agency considers and
responds to the comments after the notice period closes. Until the
advent of e-rulemaking, commenters generally were not aware of the
comments that other commenters were submitting, and many commenters waited until the last minute to submit their comments in
order to prevent any other commenters who happened to learn about
the substance of the comments from rebutting the comments.60 In contrast, Professor Cynthia Farina notes that the ideal public comment
period “would create a knowledge-advancing exchange during which
participants react to the agency’s proposal, respond to each other’s
comments, vet claims and data, and discuss alternative approaches.” 61

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

§ 5503(b)(1), (3).
33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2012).
E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 2(b)(2), (7), 116 Stat. 2899, 2901 (2002).
See HERZ, supra note 18, at 5; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78.
See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78, 90.
See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 418.
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Although agencies have not taken advantage of technology in the
first generation of e-rulemaking to transform rulemaking into a
more collaborative and dialogic process, agencies might utilize social media tools to attempt to achieve that goal. 62 EPA’s social media policies, for example, extol the benefits of using social media “to
engage and collaborate with . . . the American public.” 63 EPA’s Facebook guidance urges employees to “[e]ncourage discussion among
fans by asking questions[:] . . . Ask for your community’s thoughts,
experiences, and stories[, and] [l]isten to what they’re saying and
respond as appropriate.” 64 Similarly, EPA’s Twitter guidance reminds employees that Twitter “gives us a chance to respond to discussions about us or our mission.” 65

D. Improving Transparency of the Rulemaking Process
Agencies may also choose to use social media tools to make the notice-and-comment rulemaking process more transparent.66 Like education, transparency should lead to greater public understanding and
acceptance of rules.67 As noted above, these efficiencies should ease
enforcement for agencies and reduce the number of legal challenges
brought against rules. 68 EPA’s social media policy identifies transparency as a major objective for the agency’s use of social media.69

E. Evangelization
Agencies that are genuinely interested in seeking out as much information as possible during the rulemaking process and remain flexible regarding the substance of the rule throughout the rulemaking
process are likely to use social media tools, if they use them, to
achieve one or more of the goals outlined above. There are times,
however, when agencies may be tempted to use those tools for less
commendable purposes. Cynics argue that agencies rarely enter the
rulemaking process with an interest in having their rules trans62. Id. at 422; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 5; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 79-80.
63. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 1; see also

OFFICE OF ENVTL. INFO., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CIO 2184.0-P02.1, USING SOCIAL MEDIA
TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PUBLIC (2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/
documents/comm_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF24-2MU3] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, USING SOCIAL MEDIA].
64. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE, supra note 26.
65. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE, supra note 26.
66. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78.
67. Id. at 79.
68. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
69. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 63, at 1.
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formed by the process and that the public input in the process comes
too late. 70 In the oft-cited words of Professor E. Donald Elliott, “Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese
Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for
displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life
takes place in other venues.” 71
While that portrayal of the rulemaking process may be a bit too
pessimistic, there are certainly times when an agency might enter
the rulemaking process with a desire to minimize changes to its proposed rule and to use the notice-and-comment process to build public
support for the approach the agency has chosen in the proposed rule.
Such an agency may be tempted to use social media tools to evangelize the agency’s work. Although rulemaking is not a plebiscite,
strong public support for a rule can counteract aggressive lobbying by
regulated entities seeking Congressional legislation or Executive action to overturn the rule. While broadening public participation, furthering public education, increasing transparency and transforming
the nature of the rulemaking process can all indirectly promote public support for agency rules, evangelization is a much more direct attempt to cultivate that support. Evangelization can have detrimental
effects for an agency, though, in that it could strengthen opposition to
the agency’s rule from regulated entities if they believe that the
agency improperly cultivated support for the rule (and antagonism
towards the concerns advanced by the regulated entities).72 That opposition could generate additional negative comments from opponents during the rulemaking process and increased likelihood of litigation at the end of the process. 73
Evangelization differs from education in the goals that each seek
to achieve. Evangelization involves advocating a doctrine or idea with
the object of making converts,74 whereas education simply involves
providing persons with training or information. An agency evangelizes to shape public input and support for a specific position. An agency
educates to improve public input and generate support for whatever
rule the agency ultimately adopts, regardless of whether it was the
rule advanced by the agency at the outset of the rulemaking. At
times, it may be difficult to distinguish education from evangeliza70. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 78, 86; Dorit Rubinstein
Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 330-35 (2009).
71. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
72. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
74. See Evangelize, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/evangelize
[https://perma.cc/5FDY-2WNJ].
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tion. In the EPA WOTUS rulemaking, legislators, regulated industry
trade groups, and journalists argued that the agency used social media tools to manufacture grass roots support for, and drown out opposition to, a rule that the agency had no intention of changing in any
manner throughout the notice-and-comment process.75 EPA, on the
other hand, maintains that it was necessary to adopt an aggressive
public education campaign during the rulemaking process to counter
an aggressive misinformation campaign supported by the American
Farm Bureau.76 In such circumstances, it may be difficult to know
the true motivations for the agency’s social media campaign, but it
seems reasonable to accept the agency’s defense of its efforts in light
of (i) the need to provide accurate information to the public in order
to obtain meaningful input on the impacts of the proposal and public
reaction to the proposal, (ii) the agency’s duty under the National
Environmental Education Act to improve awareness of environmental problems, and (iii) the agency’s duty under the Clean Water Act to
encourage and assist citizen participation in the development of the
WOTUS rule. 77

F. Information Contouring
Just as an agency that enters the rulemaking process intent on
minimizing changes to the rule during the rulemaking process may
use social media to build public support for the rule through the
rulemaking process, it may use social media to build a record to
support the rule through the rulemaking process. An agency that
enters the rulemaking process with an open mind will use the pro75. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7; Jennevieve Fong, EPA Chief Downplays ‘Covert Propaganda’, THE HILL (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:48 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/

energy-environment/269167-epa-chief-downplays-covert-propaganda
[https://perma.cc/X5C6SULC]; Obama Administration is Intentionally Misleading Americans on Proposed Water Rule,
SENATE W. CAUCUS (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/10/
obama-administration-is-intentionally-misleading-americans-on-proposed-water-rule [https://
perma.cc/42SR-KWH8] [hereinafter Letter from 24 U.S. Senators].
76. See Fong, supra note 75; Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7; EPA’s McCarthy: Ditch the Myths, Not the Waters of the U.S. Rule, FARM FUTURES (July 9, 2014),
http://farmfutures.farmcentric.com/story-epas-mccarthy-ditch-myths-waters-rule-0-114845
[https://perma.cc/29TS-V5GZ]; see also infra Part II.C. EPA’s use of social media to counter
the Farm Bureau’s anti-regulatory campaign is part of a broader strategy by the White
House and its newly created Office of Digital Strategy to use social media to educate the
public and respond to criticism. See Eric Lipton & Michael D. Shear, E.P.A. Broke Law
With Social Media Push for Water Rule, Auditor Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/us/politics/epa-broke-the-law-by-using-social-mediato-push-water-rule-auditor-finds.html [https://perma.cc/7DFQ-QSLE].
77. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. In its social media policy, EPA
notes that “[i]t is [the agency’s] policy to use social media where appropriate in order to
meet its mission of protecting human health and the environment.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 2.
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cess to gather information, while an agency that enters the rulemaking process intent on reaching a predetermined outcome may
use the process to contour information.
Although rules developed by agencies do not need to be supported
by a formal administrative record, courts will strike down rules that
are arbitrary and capricious. 78 Although the standard is deferential,
courts will not uphold agency rules based on naked assertions of
agency expertise. 79 Instead, agencies must support their rules with
reasonable explanations. 80 While rules developed through informal
rulemaking are not reviewed ‘on the record,’ courts frequently examine the information that agencies receive through the notice-andcomment process when determining whether an agency’s rules are
reasonable.81 Courts often strike down agency rules when agencies
fail to adequately address issues raised during the rulemaking process.82 Since judicial review of agencies’ rules frequently focuses on the
information provided to agencies in the notice-and-comment process,
agencies that enter the rulemaking process intent on reaching a predetermined outcome have an incentive to build a record of public input
that supports that outcome. Those agencies could decide to use social
media to prompt appropriate members of the public to provide input in
the rulemaking process that supports the agencies’ desired outcome.
Just as there is a fine line between education and evangelization,
there is a fine line between information gathering and information
contouring. Agencies can appropriately seek to gather information to
fortify the ultimate factual, legal, and policy decisions that they make
in the rulemaking process against judicial attack, as long as they remain open to being transformed by the information that they receive

78. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
79. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F. Supp. 3d 861,
925 (D. Or. 2016); Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Salazar, No. SACV 11-01263-JVS (ANx),
2012 WL 5353353, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012); N. Spotted Owl (Strix Occidentalis
Caurina) v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
80. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 479
(3d Cir. 2004).
81. The APA requires agencies to provide a “concise general statement of [the] basis
and purpose” of their rules when they publish them as final rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
The statement should allow courts “to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by
the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.” Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v.
Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
82. See, e.g., Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1566, 1569 (11th
Cir. 1985); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); Action on
Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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through the notice-and-comment process.83 Agencies should not, however, seek to cultivate information submission that supports a desired outcome if the agencies have determined that they do not intend to, or need to, consider information that supports alternative
approaches. 84 As with education and evangelization, it is often difficult to discern an agency’s intent to engage in information contouring
as opposed to information gathering.
III. ERULEMAKING AND SOCIAL MEDIA

A. First Generation eRulemaking Efforts
Agency experimentation with social media tools in the notice-andcomment rulemaking process is an outgrowth of broader agency efforts to utilize technology to transform the process to achieve the
goals outlined in the preceding section.85 Early agency eRulemaking
efforts have not, however, transformed the process. 86
The E-Government Act of 2002 87 required agencies to accept comments on notice-and-comment rulemaking electronically88 and to create electronic dockets for rulemakings, which are publicly accessible
on the Internet through a Federal government website. 89 Congress’
goal in the statute was to increase citizen participation in government, improve decisionmaking by government decisionmakers, and
make the government more transparent and accountable.90 While
supporters of eRulemaking noted that technology could be used to
83. On several occasions, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that an agency’s rule can be invalidated if the agency does not review public comments with an open mind. See infra Part V.
84. See infra Part V. Agencies must be wary, though, of the unintended consequences
of broad social media campaigns. An effort to use social media to cultivate information
submission may be viewed with hostility by opponents of the agency’s rule and generate a
groundswell of negative comments from those opponents. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. The agency must respond to all of those negative comments in a rational
manner when finalizing its rule or risk having the rule invalidated either because the
agency failed to provide a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of the rule, or
because the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously. See infra Part V.
85. Some academics forecast an eRulemaking revolution that would make rulemaking
“more broadly participatory, democratic, and dialogic.” See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2. At a
minimum, the technologically enhanced process would be more efficient. Id. at 6.
86. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270.
87. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
88. Id. § 206(c), 116 Stat. at 2916.
89. Id. § 206(d), 116 Stat. at 2916. The Office of Management and Budget, which was
obligated to implement eRulemaking under the law, delegated that authority to EPA’s
Office of Environmental Information. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note
5, at 91, 91 n.80. Regulations.gov is the website that the federal government launched to
carry out its obligations under the law. Id. at 91.
90. § 2(b), 116 Stat. at 2900-01.
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host public meetings online or to use social media, blogs, and other
web applications to promote public awareness of and participation in
regulatory proceedings, and hoped that it could make the process
more dialogic, most of the early eRulemaking efforts simply involved
moving the paper process of notice-and-comment rulemaking
online.91
However, the early efforts ultimately did provide some of the benefits that supporters predicted. By making the rules, the rulemaking
process, and the information that agencies rely upon in developing
rules available online, eRulemaking has helped increase public
awareness about rules and educate the public about the rules that
agencies are developing, as well as the rulemaking process.92 The increased public awareness and education has led to greater transparency in the rulemaking process and a more democratic process. By
making the public comments accessible online, eRulemaking has
made it easier for persons to find, read, and respond to the comments.93 This provides agencies with broader information, which
should lead to better decisionmaking and better rules.
In spite of these benefits, critics argue that the nature of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process has not been changed by
eRulemaking. 94 Early eRulemaking efforts have not significantly increased public participation in rulemaking 95 and have not improved
the quality of input from the public 96 or generated ‘situational
knowledge’ from persons who failed to participate in the traditional
notice-and-comment process.97 Instead, critics note, in some proceedings, the technological reforms have spurred submission of hundreds
of thousands of duplicate public comments orchestrated by interest
groups, transforming notice-and-comment rulemaking into “notice
and spam” rulemaking.98 Those comments frequently simply articulate broad support for or opposition to the rule and are given less
91. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 92.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 93.
94. See Balla & Daniels, supra note 24, at 48; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 387;
Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 81.
95. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 8; Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 707; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 93-94.
96. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 8; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5,
at 94-95.
97. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 8. Herz notes that public commenters frequently “fail
to provide the things that agency staff most need: concrete examples, specific alternatives
to the proposal, an awareness of statutory limitations, hard data to back up conclusions,
and direct responses to any specific questions the agency may have asked.” Id.
98. Id. at 9 (quoting BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKIGOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY
CAN MAKE GOVERNMENT BETTER 138 (2009)).
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weight than the lengthy, well-researched, and narrowly focused
comments of the regulated entities and trade associations. 99 Further,
critics note that regulated entities and other traditional repeat players in the notice-and-comment process continue to submit their comments at the close of the comment period, negating any possibility of
a dialogue in the comment period. 100

B. Rulemaking 2.0 and Support for Social Media in Rulemaking 2.0
While first generation eRulemaking efforts have fallen short of
expectations thus far, reformers argue that a new generation of the
Internet, Web 2.0, and social media tools could change the nature of
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process to achieve many of the
goals outlined above. Until recently, the Web was a place where organizations or people created static, text-based sites to make information broadly and easily retrievable. 101 Developers of websites provided and controlled the content of the sites, and there was very little
interaction between the website owner and users or among the website users. 102 Over time, though, the Internet transformed. Primitive
discussion boards were replaced by blogs.103 Social networking services, such as Facebook, were created. 104 Media sharing sites, such as
YouTube, were launched, as were applications designed to facilitate
collaboration, such as Google Docs and MediaWiki, the platform for
Wikipedia. 105 Unlike Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and social media tools are collaborative and allow users to produce and generate content rather
than simply receive content. 106 Websites in the Web 2.0 world tend
toward dynamic, multi-media platforms with significant amounts of
content created by users. 107 It is for those reasons that reformers argue that a new generation of eRulemaking, Rulemaking 2.0, that incorporates social media could make the notice-and-comment process
more dialogic and transparent, as well as increase public participation in the process and improve the nature of public comments.108

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2, 11; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 393.
See sources cited supra note 101.
See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 393.
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 394.
See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2-3, 11.
See HERZ, supra note 18, at 11; Jonathan A. Obar et al., Advocacy 2.0: An Analysis of How Advocacy Groups in the United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools
for Facilitating Civic Engagement and Collective Action, 2 J. INFO. POL’Y 1, 7-8 (2012).
108. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 2-3, 11.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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EPA defines “social media” as “any online tool or application that
goes beyond simply providing information, instead allowing collaboration, interaction, and sharing.” 109 According to the agency, “[t]he
essential features of social media . . . include . . . the ability to support two-way social interactions in real time; the ability to allow creation and exchange of user-generated content . . .; and easy and lowcost accessibility by large numbers of people without specialized
skills or training.”110 Social media tools that might be used in noticeand-comment rulemaking include social networking sites, like Facebook, LinkedIn and Google+; blogs and microblogs, like Twitter or
Thunderclap; file or photo sharing sites, like YouTube, Vine, Snapchat, Flickr, and Instagram; Wikis; and applications that allow users
to vote or rank specific items, such as Reddit or Ideascale.111
ACUS has supported the expanded use of technology in noticeand-comment rulemaking for more than two decades. As early as
1995, the organization recommended that agencies should use electronic bulletin boards and other means of electronic communication
to solicit public input on rules. 112 In 2011, ACUS recommended that
agencies consider using social media in appropriate rulemakings to
raise the visibility of rulemakings.113 Two years later, ACUS adopted
a series of recommendations that encourage agencies to use social
media for a wide variety of purposes (beyond raising the visibility of
rules) in the rulemaking process. 114
The White House also strongly supports the expanded use of social
media across agency functions. On his first day in office, President
Obama issued a memorandum on transparency and open government
that called on agencies to harness technology to put information
online and to use innovative tools to collaborate and communicate
109. Id. at 12 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note
26, at 5); see also Obar et al., supra note 107, at 7 (providing an alternative definition of
social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User
Generated Content”) (quoting Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World,
Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS, no. 1, 2010,
at 61); ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,269 (defining social media to
include “any online tool that facilitates two-way communication, collaboration, interaction,
or sharing between agencies and the public”).
110. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 12.
111. Id. at 11-12.
112. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 95-3: Review of Existing Agency Regulations, § IV.A., 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,110 (Aug. 18, 1995)
(adopted June 15, 1995; not published in the C.F.R.).
113. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-8:
Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2264, 2265 (Jan. 17, 2012)
(adopted Dec. 9, 2011; not published in the C.F.R.).
114. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270-72.
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with the public. 115 The eRulemaking Program Management Office,
within the Executive Branch, subsequently endorsed the use of new
tools, such as blogs, wikis, user generated feedback and ratings, videos, and social media networks, “to promote and facilitate transparency, public engagement, and collaboration.” 116 According to a 2013 report for ACUS, there were almost 2000 government social media accounts at that time, not counting blogs. At that time, EPA maintained thirty-five Twitter feeds and thirty-two Facebook pages from
headquarters or regional offices, twelve blogs, a YouTube channel, a
Flickr photostream, multiple discussion forums, a collection of podcasts, an RSS feed for its news releases, a wiki, a page on Foursquare, and even a page on Google+. 117

C. Social Media Tools Used by EPA and the American Farm Bureau
in the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rulemaking
In light of the strong Executive Branch support for the use of social
media in rulemaking, it is not surprising that EPA recently employed
a variety of social media tools to issue a rule to define the agency’s jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) under the Federal Clean Water Act.118 To some extent, though, the breadth of the
agency’s social media campaign was prompted by the social media
campaign preemptively launched by opponents of the rule.
The agency anticipated that the rulemaking would be controversial, because the statutory language being interpreted in the rule had
been the subject of three Supreme Court decisions. 119 At the time that
EPA issued the notice of proposed rulemaking, the agency posted a
YouTube video from Gina McCarthy, the agency’s Administrator, and
several other agency officials, explaining the proposed rule and inviting public input in the development of the rule.120 A day later, the
115. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009).
116. See ERULEMAKING PROGRAM MGMT. OFFICE, IMPROVING ELECTRONIC DOCKETS ON
REGULATIONS.GOV AND THE FEDERAL DOCKET MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: BEST PRACTICES FOR
FEDERAL AGENCIES 8 (2010), https://www.regulations.gov/docs/FactSheet_eRulemaking_
Best_Practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYV6-T9M9].
117. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 16-18.
118. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054 (June 29, 2015).
119. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
120. See EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Clarify Protection for Nation’s Streams

and Wetlands: Agriculture’s Exemptions and Exclusions from Clean Water Act Expanded by Proposal, EPA (Mar. 25, 2014), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/

3881d73f4d4aaa0b85257359003f5348/ae90dedd9595a02485257ca600557e30 [https://perma.cc/
GGJ8-AKG3].
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agency released a summary of statements from various advocacy
groups that were supporting the proposal.121 A few days after the
proposed rule was released, the American Farm Bureau issued a
press release criticizing the rule and calling on its members to urge
EPA to “ditch the rule.” 122 “The Farm Bureau was supported by home
builders, the fertilizer and pesticides industries, oil and gas producers[,] and a national association of golf course owners . . . .” 123 A week
later, 213 members of Congress wrote to EPA, expressing “serious concerns” with the rule and asking EPA to withdraw the rule.124 Shortly
thereafter, the American Farm Bureau and local Farm Bureaus began
a massive social media campaign to oppose the rule. The Missouri
Farm Bureau posted a satirical video parodying the EPA rule to the
tune of Disney’s Let It Go, which attracted over 100,000 views. 125
In September 2014, the American Farm Bureau launched a “Ditch
the Rule” website and began a Twitter campaign, urging followers to
express their opposition to EPA using the hashtag #DitchTheRule.126
In the campaign, the Farm Bureau incited farmers by claiming that
EPA’s rule would regulate groundwater, puddles, and all ponds and
ditches on farms. 127 It claimed that the rule would require farmers to
obtain a federal permit to pull weeds on their land and would give
the agency veto authority over a farmer or rancher’s ability to operate. 128 The Farm Bureau also asserted that EPA’s rule violated the
limits imposed on the agency by the Supreme Court decisions and

121. See Here’s What They’re Saying About the Clean Water Act Proposed Rule, EPA (Mar.
26, 2014), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ec5b6cb1c087a2308525735900404445/
3f954c179cf0720985257ca7004920fa!OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/F6QE-FL4G].
122. American Farm Bureau Tells Members to ‘Ditch’ EPA Water Rule, AM. FARM
BUREAU FED’N (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.fb.org/newsroom/american-farm-bureau-tellsmembers-to-ditch-epa-water-rule [https://perma.cc/2VXH-2JZ7].
123. Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.
124. See Letter from Representative Chris Collins et al. to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r of the
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, & John McHugh, Sec’y of the Dep’t of the Army (May 1, 2014),
https://chriscollins.house.gov/sites/chriscollins.house.gov/files/Clean%20Water%20Act%
20Letter%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8DS-P8P8].
125. MO. FARM BUREAU, That’s Enough – (“Let it Go” Parody), YOUTUBE.COM (May 23,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0OqJqNbbs [https://perma.cc/N8RD-A5Y5].
126. See Nina Hart et al., Social Media: Changing the Landscape of Rulemaking, 30 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T, no. 1, Summer 2015, at 27, 28; Tell EPA to “Ditch the Rule”, AM. FARM
BUREAU FED’N, http://fbvideos.org/ditch-the-rule/tell-epa-to-ditch-the-rule/3616580118001
[https://perma.cc/XE82-F3DG] [hereinafter AM. FARM BUREAU, Ditch the Rule].
127. See AM. FARM BUREAU, Ditch the Rule, supra note 126.
128. See AM. FARM BUREAU, It’s Time to Ditch the Rule, INTERNET ARCHIVE WAYBACK
MACHINE, http://web.archive.org/web/20160326231232/http://ditchtherule.fb.org/custom_page/
its-time-to-ditch-the-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6FKS-53CJ]; see also It’s Time to Ditch the
Rule, HBA IOWA (Sept 4, 2014), http://hbaiowa.org/ditchtherule/iowa-water-ways/
[https://perma.cc/57BG-KWAT].

1400

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1379

warned that everyone who depends on agriculture for food would suffer because of the rule. 129
In response to the aggressive social media campaign of the American Farm Bureau, EPA turned to social media to clarify the scope
and details of the rule, to allay public concerns, and to hopefully improve the quality of public comment on the proposal. 130 In late September 2014, EPA began its social media outreach with a Thunderclap campaign to publicize the proposed rule. 131 Thunderclap is a social media platform that “allows a single message” to be shared
across multiple Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr accounts at the same
time. 132 The organizer of a Thunderclap campaign drafts a message of
no more than 117 characters that will be shared with persons who
sign up to support the campaign once the campaign is supported by a
specific number of persons chosen by the organizer of the campaign
(e.g., 500 supporters).133 For the WOTUS rule, “EPA created a Thunderclap campaign page titled, ‘I Choose Clean Water.’ ” 134 The page
was visibly attributed to EPA and, when EPA met its goal of 500
supporters, the campaign posted the following message to the supporters’ social media accounts: “Clean water is important to me. I
support EPA’s efforts to protect it for my health, my family, and my
community.” 135 The message, which included a link to the EPA web
page for the proposed rule, was posted on 980 social media accounts
through the Thuderclap campaign, where it was viewed by about 1.8
million followers and friends of those accounts. 136
The agency also created its own Twitter hashtag, #DitchTheMyth,
connected to YouTube videos and Facebook postings, that addressed the
inaccuracies in the Farm Bureau’s #DitchTheRule campaign.137 The

129. See sources cited supra note 128; Ditch the Rule – Answers, AM. FARM BUREAU,
http://www.envirolawteachers.com/farm-bureau-answers.html [https://perma.cc/M5SD-TF85];
Ditch the Rule – Go Social , A M . F ARM B UREAU , http://www.envirolawteachers.com/
farm-bureau-go-social.html [https://perma.cc/Z6BN-HD7F].
130. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 3; Hart et al., supra note 126, at 28-29; Lipton &
Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.
131. See Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29; Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.
132. See What is Thunderclap?, THUNDERCLAP, https://help.thunderclap.it/hc/en-us/
articles/235482008-What-is-Thunderclap- [https://perma.cc/7HKK-WMTG].
133. See Getting Started, THUNDERCLAP, https://help.thunderclap.it/hc/en-us/sections/
207196828-Getting-Started [https://perma.cc/NPQ5-5PH4].
134. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 4.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 5; see also Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29.
137. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 5-6; Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.
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Twitter campaign directed the public to EPA’s website, where the rule
was explained and the public were invited to comment on the rule. 138
In addition to the #DitchTheMyth campaign, the Communications
Director for EPA’s Office of Water created an EPA blog post entitled
Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules.139 The Communications Director
urged followers to post a photo of themselves on Facebook, Twitter, or
Instagram holding a #CleanWaterRules sign and explaining why
clean water is important to them. 140 As outlined in the next section,
EPA’s social media efforts focused on educating the public, increasing
public awareness that the rule was being developed, encouraging
greater participation in the development of the rule, and encouraging
public support for the rule. 141 Critics argued, however, that the agency’s social media campaign violated federal anti-lobbying laws and
demonstrated that the agency was not interested in receiving any
public input that opposed the approach that the agency preferred to
take in finalizing its rule. 142
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MEDIA
As EPA and other agencies turn more frequently to social media
in the rulemaking process, it is useful to examine whether those tools
can effectively be used to achieve the purposes outlined earlier in this
Article. While EPA’s use of social media in the WOTUS rulemaking
provides one lens through which to examine those questions, this section of the Article will not confine its focus to EPA’s efforts in that
rulemaking. The Department of Transportation and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau have engaged in a more sophisticated
and robust use of social media tools in conjunction with the Cornell
138. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7; see also Ditch the Myth: Let’s Get
Serious About Protecting Clean Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/

sites/production/files/2014-07/documents/ditch_the_myth_wotus.pdf [https://perma.cc/994PUQDZ]. EPA’s website included a fact sheet that identified and corrected twenty-three
misstatements regarding the agency’s proposed rule. See id. For instance, the document
clarified that the proposed rule (1) reduced regulation of ditches, rather than expanded
their regulation; (2) did not regulate groundwater; (3) was consistent with authority under
the Supreme Court precedent; and (4) was based on a scientific assessment that was developed through review of more than 1000 peer reviewed and publicly available scientific
studies. Id.
139. Travis Loop, U.S. ENVTL. P ROT. AGENCY, Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules,
T HE EPA BLOG, (Apr. 7, 2015) https://blog.epa.gov/blog/tag/clean-water-rules/
[https://perma.cc/9WDW-SKCM]; see also GAO Report , supra note 1, at 6-7.
140. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 6-7; Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29; Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7. The blog post was submitted by the Communications Director after the agency submitted the final rule to the Office of Management
and Budget for review. See GAO Report , supra note 1, at 21.
141. See infra Part III; see also GAO Report, supra note 1, at 3.
142. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
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eRulemaking Initiative as part of its experimental Regulation Room
program, 143 and other agencies are using social media tools in other
ways in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Nevertheless, EPA’s use of
social media tools in the WOTUS rulemaking exhibits some of the
strengths and limitations of those tools, so this section of the Article
will pay particular attention to the extent to which EPA was able to
use those tools to increase public awareness, educate the public, generate broader participation, change the nature of participation, and
generate support for the agency’s rule.

A. Increasing Public Awareness
To the extent that members of the public do not participate in the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process because they are not aware
that the government is developing rules that would impact them or
that the government is seeking their input, social media tools appear
to be an effective way to overcome that barrier.144 As of December 31,
2016, an average of more than 1 billion persons used Facebook every
day and an average of more than 1.6 billion persons used it every
month.145 Similarly, there were more than 313 million active users of
Twitter as of June 30, 2016, and more than 1 billion unique visits per
month to sites with embedded Tweets. 146 Advocacy groups have already recognized the power of social networking to recruit members
and to publicize the goals and activities of their organizations.147 In a
recent survey of more than 100 advocacy groups, all of the organizations indicated that they used social media to interact with the public. 148 The groups understand that social networks increase the speed,
reach, and effectiveness of their communication efforts. 149
Social media advocates suggest that social networking serves a
democratic function by empowering and connecting individuals and
groups, and in so doing, moving persons toward civic engagement
and collective action. 150 Today, advocacy organizations focus more
heavily on connecting people to their message through their friends
143. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
144. “[T]elling the agency’s story” is perhaps the most obvious way that agencies can
use social media in the rulemaking process, and it has been endorsed by the eRulemaking
Program Office. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 29.
145. See Facebook, Company Info , F ACEBOOK N EWSROOM , http://newsroom.fb.com/
company-info [https://perma.cc/75J4-BJXV].
Company
Facts ,
T WITTER ,
http://about.twitter.com/company
146. See
[https://perma.cc/36GU-3BW5].
147. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 13-14.
148. Id. at 11.
149. Id. at 4-5, 15.
150. Id. at 2-3.
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and followers, rather than pushing a message out to the public en
masse. 151 They recognize that users living in online communities such
as Facebook and Twitter are unlikely to venture out to an organization website and interact with the organization unless a friend has
already done so and promoted that action in the online community.152
In the survey of advocacy groups mentioned above, Facebook and
Twitter were the most popular social networking tools, and twothirds of the organizations reported using Facebook and Twitter every day to communicate with the public. 153
Agencies are beginning to learn the lessons that advocacy groups
learned over the last decade. Agencies can take advantage of personto-person connections to spread the news about rules and the input
they are seeking on the rules more broadly through social networks
than they ever could through public meetings and legal notices. 154 As
Professor Michael Herz has noted, federal agencies are beginning to
post notices regarding their proposed and final rules on their websites, blogs, Twitter feeds, and Facebook pages, and even posting videos about rulemakings to many of those sites. 155
ACUS has also concluded that social media tools can be very effective
to increase public awareness of rules and of the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. In 2013, ACUS recommended that:
Agencies should take an expansive approach to alerting potential
participants to upcoming rulemakings by posting to the agency
Web site and sending notifications through multiple social media
channels[, since] [s]ocial media may provide an effective means to
reach interested persons who have traditionally been underrepresented in the rulemaking process (including holders of affected interests that are highly diffused). 156

Through its Thunderclap campaign for the WOTUS rule, EPA was
able to take advantage of Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr to notify
151. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 395.
152. Id.
153. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 12.
154. In some cases, social networking may open doors for person-to-person communication that were closed in the offline world. For instance, when the Cornell e-Rulemaking
team was trying to use associations of pilots, flight attendants, ground crews, and travel
agents to solicit input from the members of those associations for a proposed Department of
Transportation rule regarding airline passenger rights, the associations refused to facilitate the involvement of their members. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 413. That experience reinforced the team’s belief that experts, as much if not more than other members of
the public, “will be more responsive to information coming peer-to-peer than to information
that comes from a source outside the expert community.” Id. at 414.
155. HERZ, supra note 18, at 30-31; see also Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 105.
156. ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270-71.
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almost 2 million people that the agency was developing a rule designed to protect water quality and that the agency was seeking their
input and support.157 That is a significantly greater number of persons than the agency likely reached through the publication of the
proposed rule in the Federal Register.158 In light of the fact that the
agency ultimately received over 1 million public comments on the
rule,159 it appears that the agency’s social networking efforts contributed to increased public awareness of the rule, regardless of whether
they achieved any of the other goals outlined above for social media.

B. Educating the Public
While agencies have been using social media primarily to increase
public awareness of their activities thus far, a public education goal
is not far behind. As EPA did in the WOTUS rulemaking, agencies
are increasingly creating YouTube videos, webinars, and fact sheets
to explain the issues in proposed rules or to explain the notice-andcomment rulemaking process, and linking to those resources through
Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and other social media platforms.160 ACUS’
2013 recommendations urge agencies to use multiple social media
channels to educate the public about rules and the rulemaking process,161 and to create a blog or social media site for each rulemaking
that provides information, updates, and clarifications regarding the
rule.162 The recommendations also encourage agencies to create and
post videos to social media about the rulemaking process and how to
comment effectively in the process, and to hold webinars or online
classes to demonstrate how to draft comments and to review draft
comments and suggest ways to improve them. 163
In addition, ACUS recommends that agencies create plain language versions of their rules and simplified statements of issues that
they can distribute through social media to solicit input from the
157. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
158. As Professor Herz notes, “[Q]uite simply, social media sites are the places in the
virtual world where the most people can be found.” HERZ, supra note 18, at 14.
159. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.
160. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 19, 30-31; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra
note 5, at 105. When EPA announced a proposed rule to limit greenhouse gas emissions
from power plants, the agency produced a thirty-three-minute video that addressed greenhouse gases, electricity generation, and the Clean Air Act to help citizens understand the
issues involved in the rulemaking. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 30-31.
161. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270.
162. See id. at 76,271.
163. Id. Many agencies already provide guidance on drafting effective comments on
their websites, but the ACUS recommendations envision more robust and interactive programs that take advantage of the powers of social media. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 46.
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public. 164 Most agencies have not yet adopted that approach, which is
time and resource intensive, but the Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative
(CeRI) pioneered it and regularly uses it in the rules in its Regulation
Room program.165 When the faculty and students on the Regulation
Room team work with a federal agency on a rulemaking, they create
a plain language version of the rule and divide the rule into conceptually coherent issues that are posted on the Regulation Room website for the rule.166 The team provides moderators to answer questions regarding the proposal and to provide feedback regarding the
effectiveness of comments drafted by visitors to the site. 167 While
comments submitted in the Regulation Room are not official comments, the Regulation Room team submits a summary of all the
comments to the agency sponsoring the rulemaking during the comment period for the rule. 168
While social media can, therefore, play an important educational
role in the rulemaking process, there are important limitations to its
effectiveness. First, educational materials produced by agencies and
provided through social media can only be effective if members of the
public actually read and engage with the materials. However, studies
suggest that readers do not pay close attention to most material that
they read online. 169 While many Americans report using the web, rather than conventional media, as their primary news source, a 2010
Pew Research survey found that “the average visit to an online news
site lasts [about] three minutes.” 170 Most web users briefly scan a web
page and click on the first link that interests them. 171 One social media expert recently estimated that 64 percent of web pages are never
even scrolled “below the fold” of the monitor screen. 172 The nature of
the interaction between social media sites and users is not conducive
to deep reflection or contemplation.

164. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.
165. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 390-91, 437-39. CeRI has worked with the Department of Transportation and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to solicit public
input on six rules in the Regulation Room Program. See CeRI, Regulation Room,
http://regulationroom.org [https://perma.cc/H8VA-4KKB].
166. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 438. The plain language versions are linked to
the full text of the rule, impact analyses, and other legal and scientific documents associated with the rule. Id.
167. Id. at 438-39; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 46; Johnson, Beyond the Usual
Suspects, supra note 5, at 107-08.
168. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 108.
169. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 440.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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In light of the realities of the interaction between users and social
networking sites, social media encourages simplification of information. Unfortunately, 140 character Tweets, single sentence or single
paragraph Facebook posts, or 6 second Vine videos are imperfect vehicles for explaining the intricacies of rules or the accompanying scientific and economic analyses that are frequently drafted at graduate
school reading levels. Something is bound to get lost in the translation.
Further, even when the information can be distilled into manageable and accessible formats that can be distributed through social
media, it tends to be a bit dry and unlikely to go viral. In a recent article, Professor Herz described how a short video on the rulemaking
process that won a White House competition attracted fewer than 700
views on YouTube, while videos produced by a conservative antiregulatory organization to parody the winning video were “viewed tens
of thousands of times.” 173 He notes that content must be “really interesting, funny, or edgy” to go viral.174 Educational materials produced
by agencies are unlikely to be “really interesting, funny, or edgy.” 175
Despite those limitations, social networks can still serve as valuable vehicles to deliver educational materials. Although there are
space limits on Tweets, Facebook posts, blog posts, and other social
networking platforms, it is not necessary to include the entirety of
one’s message in a social media post. Tweets, Facebook posts, blog
posts, and other social media posts frequently include embedded
links, so agencies may spread the word about videos, webinars, fact
sheets, and other educational materials and websites through those
links. 176 That is precisely what EPA did in the WOTUS rulemaking
through its #DitchTheMyth campaign and Thunderclap campaign.177
In both cases, the agency linked its communications to a website that
provided educational materials regarding the rule. 178 EPA’s #CleanWaterRules blog post also linked to EPA websites and external websites regarding the rule and clean water, although the blog entry was
posted after the public comment period for the rule was closed. 179
173. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 34-35.
174. Id. at 35.
175. Id.
176. Advocacy organizations have understood that for a decade or more and, in the
survey outlined earlier in this Article, most organizations identified Facebook and Twitter
as the preferred vehicles for education. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 12-13, 18-19.
Surprisingly, the organizations surveyed ranked YouTube as the least effective social media tool for education. Id. at 19.
177. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
179. The entry was posted on the blog when the agency submitted its final rule to the
Office of Management and Budget for review prior to publication, so the campaign was clearly
not targeted to educate the public as a means of facilitating broader input into the develop-
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It was incumbent on EPA to engage in a broad social media campaign to educate the public on the WOTUS rule for two reasons. First,
the rule was exceedingly complex and was posted to Regulations.gov
with 283 supporting documents, including an 82 page economic analysis of the rule and a connectivity study that reviewed and synthesized
1200 publications from peer reviewed scientific literature.180 Second,
opponents of the rule were aggressively using social media to distribute false and inaccurate information about the rule.181 It was important, therefore, for the agency to use the same platforms to rebut
the information that opponents were using to distribute it.

C. Generating Broader Participation and Better Comments
Advocates argue that social media tools provide a vehicle to reach
out to persons who have frequently been left out of the rulemaking
process, including minority communities,182 and to solicit information
that is essential to the development of the rule from persons who
have access to that information. 183 Although social media tools may
be effective for increasing public awareness about rules and the
rulemaking process and may have some value for educating the public about rules and the rulemaking process, they have not yet proven
to be very useful for attracting those new participants to the process
or improving the quality of the comments provided in the process.184
The limited success may be due to the fact that most citizens, including teens and younger adults who are more likely to be engaged with
ment of the rule. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 21. Instead, EPA approached the campaign with more general educational goals. As noted in Part IV.E., critics may question
whether the agency’s motivation for the #CleanWaterRules campaign was educational at all.
180. See U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880, DEFINITION OF “WATERS
OF THE U NITED S TATES ” UNDER THE C LEAN W ATER A CT , https://www.regulations.gov/
docket?D=EPA-HQ-QW-2011-0880.
181. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
182. A 2010 report on “Government Online” prepared by the Pew Research Center found
that African Americans and Latinos were using social media considerably more than Caucasians and were significantly more likely to find government social media helpful and informative. See AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., GOVERNMENT ONLINE 6 (2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Government_Online_2010_
with_topline.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5YJ-FDV3]; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 434. At the
same time, though, to the extent that there may still be a “digital divide,” where some socio-economic groups lack access to the Internet, relying on the web as a participation tool
exacerbates that inequity. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 96.
183. See supra Part I.C. In the survey of advocacy organizations described earlier in
this Article, almost all of the organizations felt that social media tools are effective in facilitating collective action and civic engagement, and most organizations indicated that they
use those tools every day. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 18. For purposes of mobilizing
citizens and submitting citizens’ comments to government, the advocacy organizations
ranked Facebook and listserves as the best tools, followed closely by Twitter. Id. at 13.
184. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 20-24.
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social media,185 are not interested in participating in the process even
if they know it is going on and have been educated about the process
and the issues involved in the rulemaking. 186 Social media has not
significantly increased citizen interaction with government agencies
outside of the rulemaking context, so the lack of participation in
rulemaking may simply be an extension of that phenomenon.187
To some extent, though, the limited success may be due to the fact
that agencies have not utilized the tools in an optimal manner. In
order to attract new participants to the rulemaking process and receive better comments from the public, agencies must be diligent in
developing a plan to reach those persons using traditional tools and
social media and in encouraging them to participate in the process
and provide more effective input.
ACUS addressed this issue in 2013 when it recommended that
agencies develop communications plans for rules using tools specifically tailored to the rule and to all types of stakeholders or participants that the agency is trying to engage, and to target those communications in an evenhanded manner that encourages all types of
stakeholders to participate. 188 Critics would likely argue that while
EPA’s social media campaign for the WOTUS rulemaking was tailored to attract particular types of participants, it did not encourage
all types of stakeholders to participate. 189 In another 2013 recommendation, ACUS noted the value of using multilingual social media
outlets to reach underrepresented groups and stressed the importance of creating a social media message that clearly and specifically identifies how a proposed rule would target participants and
what information would be most useful to the agency. 190 Here again,
185. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 435.
186. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 435-36 (speculating that most issues in federal
rulemaking are likely to have little interest for younger adults); Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 115. In the advocacy organization survey, a number of participants suggested that generational and digital literacy gaps prevent social media from being a more effective civic engagement tool. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 16-17. Although most rulemakings attract significantly more comments from regulated entities and
interest groups than from the general public, there are exceptions. For instance, in a recent
National Highway Transportation Administration rulemaking addressing vehicle-tovehicle communications, 94 percent of the comments were submitted by members of the
general public. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 714.
187. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 20-21.
188. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.
189. The Thunderclap campaign seemed to very broadly target persons who would
support the agency’s rule and enlisted them to spread the word about the rule to their
friends and followers on social media. While the #DitchTheMyth campaign was designed to
target an audience of supporters and opponents, it would be difficult to argue that the
agency was trying to solicit more informed comments from opponents of the rule through
that campaign.
190. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.
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critics would likely suggest that EPA’s social media messaging did
not clearly identify the type of information that would be most useful
to the agency in the rulemaking process. 191 Consequently, while the
WOTUS rulemaking generated over a million public comments, most
of the comments provided by ‘new voices’ simply expressed general
support or opposition to the rule, and the agency’s use of social media
did not unearth significant amounts of ‘localized knowledge.’ 192
The Regulation Room Program administered by the Cornell
eRulemaking Initiative provides an example of the outreach approach envisioned by ACUS. When CeRI was working with the Department of Transportation on a rule that would ban texting while
driving by commercial vehicle drivers, they identified six groups that
might have an interest in the proposed rule, and developed targeted
messaging for those groups using traditional media, phone calls, emails, and social network posting.193 They adopted a proactive and
reactive approach, monitoring social networks and posting responses
to persons who posted comments or questions about the rule.194 They
adopted a similar approach when working with the agency on an airline passenger rights rule. 195 As a result of the planning and targeted
outreach, 90 percent of the persons who participated in the Regulation Room program indicated that they had never participated in notice-and-comment rulemaking before.196 Despite that success, only a
small percentage of the traffic to the Regulation Room rulemaking
site came from Facebook or Twitter.197
The Regulation Room experiment demonstrates the importance of
combining social media with traditional outreach tools, identifying
appropriate social media groups to reach targeted audiences, and being diligent in monitoring and replying to social network postings.198
All of that is very time consuming, and few agencies have expended
191. EPA simply directed commenters to the agency’s web page for the rule and encouraged commenters to provide input on the range of issues covered in the rule.
192. See Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29. Many commenters criticized EPA for failing to
proactively seek out input from stakeholders, including state and local officials. Id. at 29-30.
193. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 396-97.
194. Id. at 398-399. Using a social network monitoring tool, the Regulation Room team
found almost 100 blogs about the rulemaking and posted comments to those blogs, inviting
persons to participate in the rulemaking through the Regulation Room program. Id.
195. Id. at 403-04.
196. Id. at 392-93.
197. Id. at 411. In the airline passenger rights rulemaking, only 4.5 percent of the visits to the Regulation Room website came from Facebook or Twitter. Id. However, the potential power of social media in the rulemaking process was demonstrated by the fact that 44
percent of the traffic pertaining to one issue in the rulemaking, peanut allergies, originated
from Facebook. Id. at 411-12.
198. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 32.
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the time and resources to target that input. Consequently, in the cases where social media efforts, and e-rulemaking in general, have increased public participation in rulemaking, they have merely increased the quantity of participation, but have not connected agencies to the localized knowledge and expertise which would be most
helpful to agencies in the rulemaking process. 199 It has not been uncommon in the e-rulemaking era for regulated entities and interest
groups to spearhead mass e-mail comment campaigns that generate
thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of comments on high profile
rules. 200 In the WOTUS rulemaking, for instance, several organizations sponsored comment submission campaigns that generated tens
of thousands of comments each. 201 Agencies must devote significant
time and resources to reviewing the comments, which are frequently
duplicative or nearly duplicative and often simply express support for
or opposition to the rule, or a portion of the rule, without providing
any useful data, expertise, or localized knowledge. 202
199. The extent to which ‘localized knowledge’ will be helpful to agencies will vary,
depending upon the nature of the rulemaking. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 427-28;
Reiss, supra note 70, at 344. Such input will, however, almost always be more helpful than
the input of members of the public who are generally interested in a rule, but have no specialized expertise or knowledge to offer in comments. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 22.
ACUS has recognized that “both the quality of comments and the level of participation in
social media discussions are often much lower than one might hope.” ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270. In the NHTSA vehicle to vehicle rulemaking mentioned above, although a significant majority of the comments came from the general public, comments from advocacy organizations averaged 133 pages and comments from manufacturers or industry averaged 32 pages, but 90 percent of the comments from the general
public were less than one page long. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 715.
200. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 416-17; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects,
supra note 5, at 95-96; Obar et al., supra note 107, at 6; Stuart W. Shulman, The Case

Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S.
Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23 (2009) [hereinafter Shulman, Perverse Incentives]; Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably Won’t) Change Everything, 1 I/S 111 (2005); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-GOV’T 41 (2006).
201. See Stephen M. Johnson, WOTUS Rulemaking – Mass Comments , http://

www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/WOTUS rule mass comments.html [https://perma.cc/2KQK-6M3J]
[hereinafter Johnson, Mass Comments]. Of the 1,127,925 comments that were posted on
Regulations.gov for the WOTUS rulemaking as of June 10, 2016, only 20,592 (less than 2
percent of the total) were unique comments. Id. A search of the comments posted on the
site revealed that eighteen organizations promoted comment campaigns via the web, email, or postcards that generated more than 10,000 comments each. Id. The ten largest
mass comment campaigns generated 844,951 submissions, or 75 percent, of the 1,127,925
comments received by EPA. Id. Environment America organized a campaign that contributed 218,542 duplicate comments and the Natural Resources Defense Council organized a
campaign that contributed 108,076 duplicate comments. Id.
202. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 25-26; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 416-17; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 95-96, 112. Professor Herz notes that an
agency would need to expend 700 staff hours to review 250,000 comments from a mass email campaign, even if the agency spent less than ten seconds reviewing each comment to
ensure that it was merely duplicative. HERZ, supra note 18, at 26 (quoting Bridget C.E.
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It is not surprising that social media tools have not yet produced
an outpouring of useful data, expertise, and localized knowledge from
commenters, as the nature of social media is not conducive to the development of that type of public input. As noted earlier, users spend
little time on Facebook or other social networks reading or engaging
in the type of deep thought necessary to develop comments on proposed rules.203 Social networks facilitate the distribution of content,
but they do not necessarily make the production of content easier.204
Thus, social networks do little to make it easier for citizens to write
effective comments.205 In addition, to the extent that social media
tools do facilitate creation of content, the content is generally videos,
photos, and mashups. 206 That is not necessarily the type of content
that is optimal for rulemaking comments.207
There are other reasons why social media tools do not encourage
the development of the type of public input that is most helpful to
agencies. Social network users spend a lot of time liking, ranking,
and sharing preferences. 208 Voting is a powerful tool to engage users
in online communities. 209 Consequently, when commenting on proposed rules, social networkers are more likely to express general
support for, or opposition to, a rule or a part of a rule than they are
to engage in a critical analysis of the rule or provide data or expertise to support their position. However, rulemaking is not a plebiscite, so agencies normally will not materially alter rules in the
rulemaking process simply because a majority of commenters support or oppose a particular approach. 210 Consequently, in many cases, general expressions of support for a rule are not particularly
helpful comments for an agency. 211 Commenters who do not realize
that legal and policy barriers may prevent the agency from adopting
an approach in a rule that a majority of commenters support may

Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 893, 901 (2011)). Consequently,
researchers are exploring automated tools to review such comments. Id. at 25.
203. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at
25-26.
204. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 24.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 441-42.
209. See id. at 443-44.
210. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 26.
211. Nevertheless, in defending the agency’s final WOTUS rule against critics, the EPA
Administrator stressed that almost 90 percent of commenters supported the approach the
agency took in the final rule. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.
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become disillusioned with the rulemaking process and feel that the
agency is ignoring their input. 212
Finally, in the Web 2.0 world, users also spend a lot of time engaging in “flaming,” “troll[ing],” and other forms of “uncivil discourse.” 213
When those traits carry over into public commenting on a rule, it
does not improve the quality of comments on the rule.214
Even though social media tools may not ultimately increase the
quality of public comments, there may be some value in increasing
the quantity of public comments on rules. For some rules, knowing
public sentiment toward a particular approach that the agency is
considering in a rule may help the agency develop a better and more
effective rule. 215 For instance, when an agency is developing a rule
designed to provide consumers with information on a label or to solicit information from the regulated community on a form, the agency
will likely be able to develop a more effective form or label once it
knows how consumers or the regulated community are likely to react
to various versions of the form or label.216 In light of that, while
ACUS counsels that rulemakings are not generally enhanced by
crowdsourcing, it recommends that “when the issue to be addressed
[in a rulemaking] is the public or user response itself . . ., direct submission to the public at large may lead to useful information.” 217
For other rules, even if the level of public support for or against an
approach considered in a proposed rule may not help the agency develop a better rule, it may provide the agency with valuable information regarding whether the regulated community is likely to challenge that approach, whether it will be difficult to enforce that approach, and whether Congress will likely oppose that approach when

212. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 27; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note
5, at 96, 114; see also ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270.
213. Farina et al., supra note 23, at 447; HERZ, supra note 18, at 24.
214. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 24. However, Professor Cynthia Farina and her colleagues suggest that online disinhibition can allow for “a more open and direct exchange of
ideas, especially unpopular ones.” Farina et al., supra note 23, at 450-51.
215. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 428-29; Reiss, supra note 70, at 344.
216. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 428-29 (discussing how DOT used information
about existing tire labeling requirements and consumer tire purchasing behavior in conjunction with preferences expressed by consumers toward a variety of tire labeling options
in the rulemaking process to develop a label to provide information to consumers regarding
how tire purchasing choices affect fuel economy).
217. ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271. In many other situations, the type of input provided through social media is not helpful for rulemaking. In his
report to ACUS that formed the basis for ACUS’ recommendations, Professor Herz suggests that “[r]ulemakings that primarily involve questions of statutory interpretation,
technical knowledge, or scientific expertise may be poorly suited to the kinds of responses
usually produced by social media.” HERZ, supra note 18, at 28.
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the rule is finalized.218 Although rulemaking is not a plebiscite, agencies have limited enforcement and litigation resources. In cases
where they have discretion to choose between one regulatory approach that is likely to be vigorously challenged and another that can
be enforced more readily, they may choose to adopt the less controversial approach if they appreciate the depth of opposition to the controversial approach and there are not strong policy reasons for adopting the other approach despite the likelihood of the challenge.219
Finally, as noted above, broad public participation, which can be
demonstrated by a significant increase in the quantity of public
comments on a rulemaking, can legitimize agency decisionmaking
and increase public confidence in, and acceptance of, agency rules. 220
However, since citizen support for agency rules may be eroded when
an agency adopts an approach that is at odds with the approach preferred by a majority of the public participants in the rulemaking process,221 ACUS recommends that agencies explain to the public how
the agency plans to use input generated from voting or ranking tools
if the agency uses such tools.222

D. Changing the Nature of Public Participation
Just as social media tools have been largely ineffective for generating broader public participation in the rulemaking process and
better public comments, they have also been ineffective for changing the nature of public participation in the process. Despite the
hopes of supporters, 223 social media tools have not opened up a dialogue between agencies and the public or between commenters during the rulemaking process. 224 This should not be surprising, since
218. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 429-30; Reiss, supra note 70, at 344-45.
219. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 429 (discussing the prioritization of regulatory
interventions in DOT’s airline passengers’ rights rulemaking based on the level of concern
expressed in the rulemaking process toward various regulatory interventions). Information
about public preferences may be valuable to an agency even if the agency does not choose
to change a rule in any meaningful way in response to that information, simply because it
provides the agency with more information about public concerns that may be useful to the
agency in future rulemakings. See Boustead & Stanley, supra note 27, at 709.
220. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; see also Reiss, supra note 70, at
344-45.
221. See Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 85-86, 96.
222. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.
223. See, e.g., HERZ, supra note 18, at 14-15, 47; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 422.
Advocacy groups also praise social media tools as a means of facilitating conversations with
citizens, allowing them to adapt their message and strategies in response to those interactions. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 15.
224. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 49. Professor Herz notes, though, that a transformation in the nature of the dialogue may not provide significant benefits to agencies, since
“the informational challenges involved in rulemaking do not lend themselves to elucidation
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the predominant currencies of social networking—liking, ranking,
and voting—are not conducive to stimulating a deeper dialogue or
exchange of views. 225 In addition, the prevalence of flaming,
trolling, and uncivil dialogue online provide significant barriers to
improved dialogue between agencies and the public or between
commenters during the rulemaking process. 226
The CeRI Regulation Room Program demonstrates the potential for
social networking to change the nature of the dialogue in the rulemaking process, as threaded commenting could be a useful tool to facilitate
greater interaction between agencies and the public or between commenters during the process.227 Along those lines, ACUS has recommended that agencies consider using blogs to generate a dialogue
about rules.228 However, the CeRI project is successful because it involves human intervention and moderation,229 and ACUS has recommended that agencies consider the use of facilitators “to manage rulemaking discussions conducted through social media.” 230 Employing
moderators and facilitators to manage the social media dialogue may
be too time consuming and resource intensive for most rulemakings.231
It is difficult to conceive how agencies would change the nature of the
dialogue in the rulemaking process to increase the interaction between
the agencies and the public and between commenters during the process without expending considerable additional resources.
Even if agencies had the resources to provide facilitators or moderators for blogs and social networking dialogues for every rulemaking, it is unlikely that they would expend those resources to change
the nature of the dialogue in the rulemaking process. Like many
agencies, EPA has adopted guidelines to discourage its employees
from responding to social media postings except in certain circumby broad lay commentary” and because most issues in rulemaking do not lend themselves
to “crowdsourcing.” Id. at 57.
225. See HERZ, supra note 18, at 26; Farina et al., supra note 23, at 440-45.
226. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 447-51.
227. See id. at 421; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 49-50; Johnson, Beyond the Usual
Suspects, supra note 5, at 106.
228. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.
229. See Farina et al., supra note 23, at 422; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 50; Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 5, at 107-08.
230. ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,271.
231. Id. at 76,270. EPA’s social media policy requires the agency to review comments
that are going to be posted to social networks used by the agency before the comments are
posted, if the network allows such moderation. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL
MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 2. If the comments cannot be reviewed before they are
posted, the policy requires agency representatives to review the comments, and possibly
remove them, as soon as possible during business hours after they are posted. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 63, at 4.
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stances, and to limit the content of the responses. 232 Every comment
made by a representative of the agency on social media may have relevance in challenges to the rules ultimately adopted by the agency
and may open up additional avenues for opponents to challenge the
rule.233 Consequently, agencies are unlikely to be interested in engaging in extensive dialogues with the public during the rulemaking process through social media.

E. Generating Public Support for Agency Rules
While it does not appear that social media tools have been particularly helpful in changing the nature of the dialogue in rulemaking,
broadening participation, or improving the quality of comments, they
hold some promise for educating the public and increasing public
awareness of rulemaking. Their greatest strength, though, may be in
generating public support for agency rules, and this is an area where
agencies must proceed with caution. To the extent that an agency
uses social media in the rulemaking process to evangelize, rather
than to educate or raise awareness, it opens itself up to charges that
the rulemaking process violated the procedures of the APA or that
the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the rule.234
As noted earlier in this Article, evangelization involves advocating a
doctrine or idea with the object of making converts, whereas education simply involves providing persons with information. 235 An agency
evangelizes to shape public input and support for a specific position.
An agency educates to improve public input and generate support for
whatever rule the agency ultimately adopts, regardless of whether it
was the rule advanced by the agency at the outset of the rulemaking.
Advocacy organizations recognize the power of social media when
it is used to organize supporters in collective action and rely on Facebook, Twitter, and blogs almost every day to evangelize their mission,
raise funds, and prompt followers to action.236 Agencies are using social media for similar purposes, following the lead of President
Obama, who formed an Office of Digital Strategy to generate support
232. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE, supra note 26; U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, FACEBOOK GUIDANCE, supra note 26.
233. See infra Part V; see also HERZ, supra note 18, at 49. The implications for litigation would be reduced if the agency were engaging in social media discussions prior to the
commencement of the rulemaking process. In his report to ACUS, Professor Herz notes
that agencies could use blogs and social networking prior to the publication of a notice of
final rulemaking to facilitate increased dialogue among the agency and stakeholders. See
HERZ, supra note 18, at 36-39.
234. See infra Part V.
235. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
236. See Obar et al., supra note 107, at 6, 11-15, 18-19.
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for his programs. 237 The difference between using social media to
raise awareness of a rule or the rulemaking process and using social
media to promote support for a rule is important. The difference is
apparent in the tone of the message provided by the agency. Unlike
messages designed to educate or inform, messages designed to generate support for agency action usually involve some call to action.
Social media can be a powerful tool to generate support for a rule.
EPA’s Thunderclap campaign in the WOTUS rulemaking is estimated to have reached 1.8 million people.238 In response to that campaign, advocacy organizations on both sides of the debate organized
their own social media campaigns.239 More than 98 percent of the 1
million comments received by EPA on the rulemaking were generated by mass communication campaigns by advocacy organizations.240
Ultimately, almost 90 percent of the comments received by EPA on
the rule supported the rule. 241
Although EPA adopted an aggressive social media campaign for
the WOTUS rulemaking, which ultimately resulted in strong public
support for the agency’s rule, the major focus of the agency’s campaign was educational and informational, rather than evangelical.
EPA’s #DitchTheMyth campaign was a clear example of an educational campaign. The campaign focused on providing very detailed
and specific facts to the public to clarify misconceptions regarding the
rule that were being created by the social media campaign of the
American Farm Bureau.242
The primary focus of the Thunderclap campaign was also educational and informational, as it provided a link to EPA’s website with
background information about the proposed rule, the rulemaking
process, and ways to get involved in the rulemaking process. 243

237. See Lipton & Shear, supra note 76. EPA indicates that it is the agency’s policy “to
use social media . . . to meet its mission of protecting human health and the environment.”
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, supra note 26, at 2.
238. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 5; Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29.
239. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text; see also Hart et al., supra note
126, at 27-28.
240. See Johnson, Mass Comments, supra note 201; see also Hart et al., supra note
126, at 28. The largest campaign in opposition to the rule was organized by the Committee
for a Constructive Tomorrow and generated 62,882 comments. Johnson, Mass Comments,
supra note 201.
241. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. Critics may claim that the campaign was evangelical, rather than informational, because the message provided by EPA
for the campaign stated, “I support EPA’s efforts to protect [clean water] for my health, my
family, and my community.” See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 4. Although the agency used
that message to attract attention to the ongoing rulemaking, the primary focus of the mes-
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While the #CleanWaterRules campaign also provided links to
agency web pages with educational material regarding the rulemaking, it focused more heavily than the #DitchTheMyth or Thunderclap
campaigns on generating support for the agency’s rule. The campaign
encouraged followers to take pictures of themselves with a #CleanWaterRules sign and share the picture (and words of support for
clean water) on social media. 244 To the extent that the campaign included an educational message, it was clearly secondary. However,
the #CleanWaterRules campaign was launched after the comment
period on the rule was completed and the agency had prepared a final
rule that was being reviewed by the White House prior to publication.245 For all intents and purposes, that social media campaign was
launched at the end of the rulemaking process. The only reason
agency evangelization of a rule may be problematic is because it
could demonstrate that the agency is not willing to consider changes
to a rule during the rulemaking process. That is not a concern when
the rulemaking process has been completed.
Even if an agency uses a social media campaign to evangelize its
rule during the comment period for the rule, the agency’s rule is not
per se invalid. There is no statute or rule that prohibits agencies from
soliciting support for their rules during the rulemaking process.246 An
agency’s evangelization is only problematic when it is motivated by an
underlying unwillingness to consider changing the rule based on input
during the comment period.247 If an agency is unwilling to consider
changing a rule based on public input, though, the agency’s rule is
likely to be invalidated regardless of whether the agency used social
media to generate support for the rule. Social media is not the problem
in that case. The agency’s closed mind is the problem.
While agencies may view social media as a powerful tool to generate support for a rule, aggressive efforts to generate support for a
rule may have unintended consequences for agencies. For example,
although EPA’s social media campaign contributed, to some extent,
to a flood of public comments and 90 percent support for the rule, the
rule was still challenged by states, local governments, farmers, de-

sage was to direct readers to the agency’s website, where the agency provided information
and educational materials on the rule and the issues involved in the rulemaking.
244. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
246. It is, however, unusual. See Lipton & Davenport, Critics, supra note 7. ACUS, for
instance, recommends that agencies adopt social media plans that are evenhanded and
encourage all types of stakeholders to participate. See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5,
supra note 15, at 76,271.
247. See infra Part V.
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velopers, and other regulated entities in numerous lawsuits. 248 Many
of those challengers expressed resentment over the agency’s social
media campaign, arguing that the campaign demonstrated the agency’s refusal to consider public input on the rule.249 Federal legislators
expressed similar concerns 250 and introduced bills to overturn the
rule.251 In short, even though the social media campaign generated
fairly broad public support for the rule, it exacerbated the significant
opposition to the rule from those most likely to challenge the rule and
delay its implementation. In the end, courts will not care that 90 percent of the public comments supported the agency’s rule. Neither will
federal legislators, unless those 90 percent are major contributors.
V. APPROPRIATIONS LAWS AND SOCIAL MEDIA
EPA’s use of social media in the WOTUS rulemaking sparked
claims that the agency was violating not only the APA but also federal
appropriations laws. The GAO report mentioned at the outset of this
Article addressed the appropriations laws’ limits.252 As will be apparent from the following discussion, an agency will be more likely to run
afoul of appropriations limits when it is using a social media campaign
to evangelize than when it is using the tools to increase awareness,
educate the public, or increase transparency of its rules. Although
GAO found that the agency violated some provisions of those laws, in
the long term, appropriations laws will impose far fewer restrictions
than the APA on agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking.

248. Within the first two days after the agencies published the final rule, twenty-seven
states filed lawsuits challenging the rule. See Chris Marr, More Than Half of States Sue
EPA to Block Rule on Water Jurisdiction, 46 ENV’T REP. 2012 (June 30, 2015). Within another two weeks, fourteen agriculture and industry groups filed lawsuits. See Amena H.
Saiyid & Anthony Adragna, Chamber of Commerce Joins in Water Rule Lawsuit, 46 ENV’T
REP. 2143 (July 13, 2015).
249. See Hart et al., supra note 126, at 29-30.
250. See Fong, supra note 75; Letter from 24 U.S. Senators, supra note 75. In the letter
to EPA from Mitch McConnell and 23 other Senators, the legislators argued that “EPA’s
social media advocacy removes any pretense that the agency will act as a fair and neutral
arbiter during the rulemaking.” Id.
251. The bills that were introduced in the months surrounding the agency’s issuance of
the final rule include the Defense of Environment and Property Act of 2015, S. 980, 114th
Cong. (2015), the Federal Water Quality Protection Act, S. 1140, 114th Cong. (2015), the
Defending Rivers for Overreaching Policies Act of 2015, S. 1178, 114th Cong. (2015), the
Don’t Ignore the Will of the American People Act, H.R. 2599, 114th Cong. (2015), the Federal Regulatory Certainty for Water Act, H.R. 2705, 114th Cong. (2015), and the Department of Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 2822, 114th
Cong. (2015).
252. See GAO Report, supra note 1.
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A. Statutory Limitations
Pursuant to the Antideficiency Act, federal agencies may only
spend money in ways authorized by Congress.253 When Congress appropriates funds to agencies, it is not unusual for the legislature to
impose limits on the agencies’ use of those funds. 254 The limitations
that applied to EPA’s use of funds for the WOTUS rulemaking were
typical of limits that Congress places on most agencies when it appropriates funds to the agencies. Section 718 of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2014 prohibited
the use of EPA’s appropriations for unauthorized “publicity or propaganda purposes.” 255 Section 715 of that law prohibited the use of
EPA’s appropriations for “indirect or ‘grassroots’ lobbying in support
of, or in opposition to, pending legislation.” 256
The limitations in appropriations laws are interpreted and administered by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is
headed by the Comptroller General.257 With regard to the provisions
in appropriations laws that prohibit unauthorized “publicity or propaganda,” GAO has interpreted the provisions to limit three categories
of activities by agencies: (1) “self-aggrandizement” by public officials;
(2) “covert propaganda” that is designed to influence the public without identifying the government as the source of the information; and
(3) “materials that are purely partisan in nature.” 258 Since agencies
must communicate information to the public regularly and may have
statutory missions to educate the public, GAO interprets the limits
on agencies’ use of funding for publicity narrowly. 259
253. The statute makes it unlawful for a federal agency to “make or authorize an
expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation.” 31
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2012).
254. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1353 (1988).
255. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 718, 128 Stat. 5, 234.
Congress imposed the same restrictions on EPA’s 2015 appropriations. See Consolidated
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, §§ 715, 718, 128
Stat. 2130, 2382-83.
256. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 17; see also § 715, 128 Stat. at 234; § 401, 128 Stat.
at 2443.
257. See 31 U.S.C. § 712(1), (3)-(4) (2012). The statute authorizes the Comptroller General to “investigate all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money; . . . [and] make an investigation and report ordered by either House of Congress or a
committee of Congress having jurisdiction over revenue, appropriations, or expenditures.”
Id. § 712(1), (4). The GAO’s interpretations are published in a federal publication known as
the Red Book. See 1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter RED BOOK].
258. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-303SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW: ANNUAL UPDATE OF THE 3D EDITION, 4-24 (2015), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/668991.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN2L-8M92] [hereinafter GAO 2015 Annual Update].
259. See Robert H. Wood, Lining the Pockets of Publicists with Federal Funds: The
Prohibition Against Use of Agency Appropriations for Publicity and Propaganda, 7 LOY. J.
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With regard to “self-aggrandizement,” GAO defines the term to
mean “publicity of a nature tending to emphasize the importance of
the agency or activity in question.” 260 The prohibition against selfaggrandizement does not prohibit agencies from engaging in legitimate information activities, so GAO has been reluctant to find violations of the limits as long as agencies can provide a reasonable justification for their activities. 261 Along those lines, the GAO has found
that agencies may use funds to advocate their positions, even on controversial subjects, to report on their programs, justify their policies,
and respond to criticism, without violating the prohibition against
self-aggrandizement. 262
With regard to “covert propaganda,” GAO defines the term to
mean “materials such as editorials or other articles prepared by an
agency or its contractors at the behest of the agency and circulated as
the ostensible position of parties outside the agency.” 263 GAO will find
such materials to be covert propaganda when the agency has concealed its role in producing or distributing the information.264
With regard to “materials that are purely partisan in nature,”
GAO has stated that “the offending materials must be found to have
been ‘designated to aid a political party or candidate.’ ”265 Because it
is often difficult to determine whether agency materials are purely
political, one standard applied by the GAO is that “the use of appropriated funds is improper only if the activity is ‘completely devoid of
any connection with official functions.’ ” 266

B. EPA’s Use of Social Media in the WOTUS Rule
After EPA finalized its WOTUS rule, Senator James Inhofe, chair
of the Senate’s Committee on Environment and Public Works, asked
GAO to investigate whether EPA’s use of social media in the rulemaking violated the appropriations limits on unauthorized publicity
or propaganda or the limits on lobbying. 267 In response, GAO examPUB. INT. L. 133, 147 (2006). According to the “necessary expense doctrine” implemented by
the GAO, since Congress cannot specify every detail of authorized expenditures in legislation, agencies may use reasonable discretion in determining how to carry out the purposes
of the legislation. See RED BOOK, supra note 257, at 4-19 to 4-20.
260. See RED BOOK, supra note 257, at 4-199.
261. Id. at 4-200.
262. See Wood, supra note 259, at 147-48.
263. See RED BOOK, supra note 257, at 4-202.
264. Id.
265. See GAO 2015 Annual Update, supra note 258, at 4-32 (citations omitted).
266. Id. (citations omitted). To date, the GAO has not found that an agency’s materials
have been so partisan as to violate this prohibition. See id. at 4-33.
267. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 1.
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ined whether EPA’s use of Thunderclap or its #DitchTheMyth or
#CleanWaterRules social media campaigns violated those limits.268
EPA indicated that it used social media in the WOTUS rulemaking
“to clarify the issues concerning the . . . proposed rule, to provide information about streams and wetlands, to demonstrate the rule’s relevance, to provide opportunities for public engagement, and to correct what it viewed as misinformation concerning the rule.” 269
GAO ultimately concluded that EPA’s #DitchTheMyth campaign
did not violate any of the appropriations limits.270 In addition, it concluded that the agency’s #CleanWaterRules campaign did not violate
any of the limits on publicity or propaganda, 271 although an EPA blog
post that was part of that campaign linked to an external website in
a manner that the GAO concluded violated the anti-lobbying limits of
EPA’s appropriations laws. 272 Finally, GAO concluded that EPA’s use
of Thunderclap did not violate the anti-lobbying provisions of the appropriations laws and did not violate the limits on selfaggrandizement. 273 However, GAO determined that EPA did not adequately attribute the Thunderclap message to the agency, so its use
of Thunderclap constituted covert propaganda.274 Despite the outcry
by critics of the agency, GAO’s report demonstrates that the appropriations laws impose fairly minor restrictions on agencies’ use of social media. EPA used social media very aggressively to generate support for its WOTUS rule and very few of its actions were found to
have violated the self-aggrandizement, covert propaganda, or antilobbying provisions of the appropriations laws. To the extent that the
report found minor violations of the laws, those violations can be easily avoided in social media campaigns in future rulemakings.

1. #DitchTheMyth and #CleanWaterRules and the Publicity and
Propaganda Limits
As noted above, the publicity and propaganda limits in EPA’s appropriations laws limit unauthorized self-aggrandizement, covert
propaganda, and purely partisan activities by agencies. The GAO report did not find that any EPA actions were partisan, but reviewed
several statements in the #CleanWaterRules campaign to determine if

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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they constituted self-aggrandizement.275 Several of the social media
posts touted benefits or positive changes that the agency’s rule would
effect, including: “Our new rule protects clean water and in turn protects everything that depends on it—including your neighborhood grocery store,” and “Our Clean Water Rule was just finalized. . . . That’s
great news for people’s health, the environment and our economy.” 276
In the report, GAO indicated that a primary purpose of the prohibition on self-aggrandizement is to limit “communication with an obvious purpose of puffery” and that GAO “balanc[es] the restriction with
an agency’s right to disseminate information regarding its views and
policies”; thus, GAO “traditionally afford[s] agencies wide discretion
in their informational activities.” 277 While the social media posts emphasized the importance of the agency’s rule, GAO stressed that “engendering praise for the agency was not the goal,” so GAO concluded
that the agency was not engaged in self-aggrandizing activities in the
campaign. 278 GAO also noted that the National Environmental Education Act of 1990 and the E-Government Act of 2002 “evidence Congress’ interest in EPA informing the public regarding its policies and
views” and that the appropriations limits should be interpreted in
harmony with those provisions. 279 In light of the GAO’s deferential
review of EPA’s statements in praise of its rulemaking, it is likely
that the self-aggrandizement limit in the agency’s appropriations
laws present very few obstacles to agency’s use of social media to
publicize and praise their activities.
GAO also reviewed EPA’s tweets in the #DitchTheMyth social media
campaign and concluded that the agency’s tweets did not constitute
covert propaganda because the graphics used in the campaign included
the EPA logo and the tweets included the EPAWater handle at the end,
clearly signifying that EPA was responsible for the messages.280

2. Thunderclap and the Publicity and Propaganda Limits
GAO did not find that EPA’s use of Thunderclap violated the purely partisan or self-aggrandizement limits of the agency’s appropriations laws. However, the report found that EPA’s Thunderclap message violated the covert propaganda limits of the appropriations
laws.281 As noted earlier in this Article, once a campaign reaches a
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 11-12. However, EPA contests that finding. See Fong, supra note 75.
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specific number of supporters in Thunderclap, the platform posts a
message drafted by the campaign organizer to the supporters’ social
media accounts.282 The message that EPA drafted provided, “Clean
water is important to me. I support EPA’s efforts to protect it for my
health, my family, and my community.” 283 Even though EPA advertised the campaign, recruited followers for the campaign, and composed a message that included a reference to EPA and linked to
EPA’s website for the proposed rule, GAO determined that the agency’s message concealed EPA’s involvement in the campaign.284 GAO
concluded that while the initial followers of EPA’s campaign would be
aware that EPA initiated the campaign, persons who saw the message on the social media sites of the initial followers would not be
aware of that connection. 285 GAO noted that “[i]t is not enough that
an agency disclose its role to the conduit of such material if it has not
taken measures to identify its role to the intended recipient.” 286
GAO found that “EPA constructed a message to be shared by others that refers to EPA in the third person and advocates support of
the agency’s efforts” and that by doing so, “EPA deliberately disassociates itself as the writer, when the message was in fact written, and
its posting solicited, by EPA.” 287 GAO distinguished EPA’s use of
Thunderclap from the simple re-tweeting or sharing of a Facebook
post, noting that the previous or original author’s identity would be
disclosed in either of those cases, whereas Thunderclap does not retain such identifying information. 288 While GAO concluded that
EPA’s Thunderclap campaign violated the covert propaganda limits
in its appropriations laws, the decision should provide only a minor
roadblock to agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking. In the future, EPA and other agencies will need to compose any Thunderclap
messages more carefully to directly attribute the message to the
agency. Similarly, to the extent that new social media delivery platforms are developed, agencies should take care to ensure that their
messages will be formatted in a manner that attributes the message
to the agency when it is delivered to all of the ultimate recipients.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 13-14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
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3. #CleanWaterRules and the Anti-Lobbying Limits
EPA’s policy on using social media to communicate with the public
prohibits agency employees from directly or indirectly lobbying Congress,289 and the agency’s Twitter guidance prohibits employees from
lobbying or promoting political viewpoints, 290 so it is not surprising
that GOA found that most of the components of EPA’s social media
campaign in the WOTUS rulemaking did not violate the antilobbying provisions of EPA’s appropriations laws. It is surprising,
though, that GAO came to the opposite conclusion when it found that
an EPA blog post linking to an advocacy organization web page
which then linked to a separate web page urging viewers to contact
Congress violated the anti-lobbying provisions.291
As noted earlier, the EPA appropriations legislation, like most appropriations legislation, prohibits “indirect or ‘grassroots’ lobbying in
support of, or in opposition to, pending legislation.” 292 According to
GAO, “th[at] provision is violated wh[en] there is evidence of a clear
appeal by an agency to the public to contact Members of Congress in
support of, or in opposition to, pending legislation,” regardless of
whether the appeal identifies a specific piece of legislation. 293 As part
of the agency’s #CleanWaterRules campaign, an EPA employee posted a blog entry in which the author indicated that clean water was
important to him because he is a surfer and doesn’t want to get sick
from pollution and because he drinks beer and brewers need clean
water to brew beer. 294 On its face, the blog entry does not appear to
urge the public to contact Congress in support of, or opposition to,
any legislation. However, the paragraph regarding the author’s interest in surfing included a link to a Surfrider Foundation web page
that discussed clean water, and the paragraph regarding the author’s
interest in beer included a link to the Natural Resources Defense
Council’s (NRDC) Brewers for Clean Water Page. 295 Although neither
of those web pages directly urged visitors to contact Congress in support of, or opposition to, specific legislation, and the NRDC web page
did not even mention Congress, each web page linked to another web
289. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 63, at 2.
290. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TWITTER GUIDANCE, supra note 26.
291. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 11. In Congressional hearings after the report
was issued, EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy disagreed with GAO’s conclusion that EPA
violated any appropriations limits in the WOTUS rulemaking. See Fong, supra note 75.
292. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
293. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 17.
294. Id. at 18-19; see also Travis Loop, Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules, OUR PLANET,
OUR HOME (Apr. 7, 2015), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2015/04/tell-us-why-cleanwaterrules/
[https://perma.cc/MYY2-A6AZ].
295. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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page that prompted visitors to contact Congress to express opposition
to bills that would weaken the Clean Water Act or to express their
support for strong Clean Water Act protections of waters of the United States. 296 Neither of the action pages identified specific bills that
were pending. 297 However, in light of the fact that there were bills
pending in Congress that would weaken the Clean Water Act at the
time that the blog post linked to the external websites that linked to
the action pages, GAO concluded EPA, through its blog post, appealed to the public to contact Congress in opposition to pending legislation in violation of the grassroots lobbying prohibition in its
appropriations laws. 298
Even though the call to action was posted on external websites
and was made by third parties, rather than EPA, GAO concluded
that EPA “conveyed a message through the expressive act” of linking
to the external websites. 299 GAO cited several factors that influenced
its determination. First, it noted that the external websites very
clearly and prominently urged visitors to take some action to protect
clean water. 300 Second, it noted that EPA linked to the websites from
its blog post at a critical time in the rulemaking process when public
expression of support for the rule to Congress would be very helpful. 301 In addition, GAO noted that the websites to which EPA linked
were both maintained by activist advocacy organizations. 302
To the extent that the GAO found that EPA’s blog post violated
the anti-lobbying provisions of EPA’s appropriations laws, GAO has
adopted a fairly broad reading of those limitations. The report even
suggests that an agency can be liable for violating the anti-lobbying
provisions if the agency links to a website that does not include an
appeal for citizen action, but the website owner adds such an appeal
later. Specifically, GAO noted that it was not clear whether the Surfrider page included an action prompt when EPA initially linked to it,
but that it included an action prompt after EPA linked to it; thus,
GAO concluded that “EPA is responsible for the message it continues
to endorse, rather than just the message as it may have existed at a
single point in time.” 303

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
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Id. at 18.
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In light of GAO’s interpretation of the anti-lobbying provisions of
EPA’s appropriations laws, the agency may choose to avoid linking to
external sites in its social media campaigns or to be vigilant in monitoring those sites to which it links to ensure that the first level sites
do not prominently urge visitors to take some action that might ultimately result in lobbying members of Congress.

C. Enforcement of Appropriations Laws
Although EPA contested GAO’s determination that the agency
engaged in covert propaganda and ‘grassroots lobbying’ in the
WOTUS rulemaking,304 there are very few sanctions available to punish agencies if they don’t comply with appropriations laws, so the limits in those laws are likely to have little impact on agencies’ use of
social media in rulemaking. In the WOTUS rulemaking, for instance,
when GAO concluded that the agency violated the limits in the agency’s appropriations laws, it noted that “[t]he agency should determine
the cost associated with the prohibited conduct and include the
amount in its report of its Antideficiency Act violation.” 305 The Antideficiency Act requires agency heads to “report . . . to the President
and Congress all relevant facts and a statement of actions taken”
when an agency spends appropriations outside of the authority delegated to it by Congress.306 Thus, if an agency uses social media in
rulemaking in a way that violates the limits on the agency’s appropriations, the agency may have to reimburse the Treasury for the funds
expended in violation of the appropriations limits. Beyond that, the
law imposes few sanctions. Significantly, the validity of a rule will not
be impacted by an agency’s violation of appropriations limits. While an
agency employee who spends appropriations outside of the agency’s
delegated authority is nominally subject to criminal penalties,307 no
employee or officer has ever been prosecuted for such violations.308
Although the GAO is charged by Congress with interpreting and
administering appropriations laws and the GAO asserts that the
Comptroller General’s decisions are binding on agencies, 309 the
Comptroller General is a legislative branch officer, 310 and the Justice
Department takes the position that GAO’s opinions and legal inter-

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See Fong, supra note 75.
See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 2.
31 U.S.C. § 1351 (2012).
§ 1350.
See RED BOOK, supra note 257, Volume II, at 6-144.
Id. Volume I, at 1-40.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727-32 (1986).
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pretations are not binding on the Executive Branch.311 Further, the
Comptroller General does not have any statutory authority to enforce
its opinions or interpretations, 312 so the GAO can only report perceived violations of appropriations limits to Congress, the President,
and the Justice Department. 313 Even if the Executive Branch concludes that an agency’s action may have violated appropriations limits, the Justice Department will not sue a federal agency for those
violations in light of the Unitary Executive Theory. 314 In addition,
even if violations of appropriations limits may be challenged judicially in some cases by appropriate plaintiffs, courts have often declined
to decide such cases on the merits. 315
Therefore, the only repercussions that agencies may have to face in
light of violations of appropriations laws caused by social media campaigns would come from Congress in the form of oversight hearings and
some further limits on appropriations tailored to the agency’s violations.
VI. SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE APA
Although appropriations laws may not impose significant limits on
agencies’ use of social media in rulemaking, the APA imposes more
serious limits on the use of those tools, at least when agencies are
using them for purposes of evangelization, as opposed to the other
legitimate purposes outlined above. An agency could encounter problems if it is so aggressive in its efforts to use social media to generate
support for positions advanced in a proposed rule that it appears the
agency does not wish to receive any input that opposes those positions. In that case, the agency risks having the rule it ultimately
adopts invalidated on the grounds that the agency failed to provide
an opportunity for comment on the rule as required by the APA, or
that the agency’s rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency
failed to consider relevant factors or alternatives to the final rule.
Except in limited situations, the APA requires agencies to provide
notice and an opportunity for comment when they adopt legislative
311. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to The Gen. Counsels of the Exec. Branch, Whether Appropriations May be Used for Informational Video News Releases 1 (Mar. 1, 2005).
312. See Wood, supra note 259, at 155-56. Indeed, since the Comptroller General is a
Legislative Branch officer, enforcement against the Executive Branch could violate separation of powers principles. Id.
313. Id.
314. See Nelson D. Cary, Note, A Primer on Federal Facility Compliance With Environmental Laws: Where Do We Go From Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 801, 828-32
(1993). Under the theory, agencies cannot sue each other in court because they are, in effect, the same party. Id.
315. See Stith, supra note 254, at 1387-88.
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rules. 316 A series of decisions in the federal appellate courts held that
an agency does not provide an opportunity for comment on proposed
rules if the agency does not remain ‘open-minded’ about the issues
raised and engage with the comments submitted during the comment
period. 317 “The opportunity for comment must be a meaningful opportunity . . . .” 318 However, the fact that an agency does not change a
rule in response to public comments does not necessarily indicate
that the agency lacked the requisite open mind towards comments.319
In many of the cases where an appellate court has found that an
agency had not provided an opportunity for comment on a rule, the
evidence that the court relied upon was the short time period between the end of the comment period and the adoption of the final
rule or the agency’s failure to provide challengers with information
upon which the agency based its rule, rather than statements made
by the agency during the comment period. 320 While overly aggressive
calls for public support of a rule during the comment period may be
problematic, the fact that an agency makes comments during the
comment period in support of its proposed rule does not necessarily
indicate that the agency has predetermined the outcome of the rulemaking. Agencies develop proposed rules after much deliberation and
one would hope that they enter the process believing that they have
proposed a rule that is consistent with their authority under the law
and that rationally balances competing interests within the range of
acceptable policy discretion granted to them by Congress. As the D.C.
Circuit has noted, “In order to avoid trenching upon the agency’s policy prerogatives, . . . we presume that policymakers approach their
quasi-legislative task of rulemaking with an open mind—but not an
empty one.” 321 Similarly, that court has held that “[a]n administrative official is presumed to be objective and . . . mere proof that [he
or] she has taken a public position, or has expressed strong views, or
holds an underlying philosophy with respect to an issue in dispute
cannot overcome that presumption.”322

316. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
317. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011); Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994); McLouth Steel
Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
318. Rural Cellular Ass’n, 588 F.3d at 1101 (citation omitted).
319. See Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 28 F.3d at 1292.
320. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d 431; Wash. Gas Energy Servs., Inc.
v. D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 893 A.2d 981 (D.C. 2006).
321. PLMRS Narrowband Corp. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also
Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
322. United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Accordingly, positive statements by the agency that encourage
support for a rule or input on a rule are generally acceptable. However, to the extent that an agency solicits support, through social media
or otherwise, in a way that sends a message that the agency is only
interested in input that advances the approach that they have suggested in a proposed rule, it is more likely that a court might find
that the agency is not interested in engaging with the comments and
is not maintaining an open mind during the rulemaking. Indeed, several Senators alleged that EPA’s social media campaign in the
WOTUS rulemaking demonstrated that EPA had predetermined the
outcome of the rulemaking and was not approaching the comment
period with an open mind.323 Members of the House of Representatives raised similar concerns when questioning EPA Administrator
Gina McCarthy at a House Agriculture Committee hearing after the
rule was finalized. 324
Several of the complaints raised by the Senators addressed statements made by EPA in its #DitchTheMyth campaign. 325 However,
EPA’s statements were simply clarifications of misstatements being
advanced by the American Farm Bureau in its social media campaign.326 The mere fact that an agency disagrees with the mischaracterization of facts supporting a rule does not indicate that the agency
is proceeding with a closed mind in the rulemaking. Arguably, as opponents of an agency’s rule are more aggressive in spreading disinformation about a proposed rule, an agency should be able to be more
aggressive in providing accurate information without being accused
of having predetermined the outcome of the rulemaking.
The Senators also suggested that EPA’s Thunderclap campaign
demonstrated that the agency had predetermined the outcome of the
rulemaking, 327 but in that message, the agency was simply spreading
the word that it was engaged in an important rulemaking to protect
water quality and urging public participation in the process by directing interested persons to the agency’s website for the rule.328 EPA’s
solicitation of support for the WOTUS rule came close to evangelization at the end of the process, when the agency pursued its #CleanWaterRules campaign, but those calls for support came after the
323. See Letter from 24 U.S. Senators, supra note 75. The Senators wrote, “EPA’s social media advocacy removes any pretense that the agency will act as a fair and neutral
arbiter during the rulemaking” and “EPA’s social media advocacy is a firm indicator that
adverse comments will receive scant attention during the rulemaking period.” Id.
324. See Fong, supra note 75.
325. See Letter from 24 U.S. Senators, supra note 75.
326. See supra notes 137-38, and accompanying text.
327. See Letter from 24 U.S. Senators, supra note 75.
328. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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comment period was closed and the agency was preparing to publish
a final rule that included several changes that responded to public
comments.329 Even if the agency had closed its mind at that time, it
would have been appropriate for it to do so. Although EPA did not
cross a line in its use of social media in the WOTUS rulemaking, agencies must be careful to avoid using those tools so aggressively that it
sends the message that the agency will not consider opposing viewpoints in the rulemaking, or they risk having their rules invalidated
for failure to provide an opportunity for comment under the APA.
In the same way that agency evangelization of a rule may lead to
claims that the agency violated the procedures of the APA for noticeand-comment rulemaking, it may lead to claims that the agency’s
final rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to
consider, or foreclosed consideration of, relevant factors or alternatives. Under the APA, courts are empowered to strike down agency
actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” 330
In general, the arbitrary and capricious standard is a fairly deferential standard and does not allow courts to substitute their judgment
for the agency’s judgment. 331 However, in certain circumstances,
courts apply a more rigorous form of arbitrary and capricious review,
known as “hard look” review, to agency actions. 332 Through hard look
review, courts require agencies to thoroughly explain the reasoning
for their decision; courts focus on, among other things, whether the
agency has considered all of the relevant factors and alternatives in
making its decision. 333 As the Supreme Court explained in Motor Ve-

hicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., an agency decision can be arbitrary under the test
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 334

329. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 21.
330. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
331. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
332. The term “hard look” review originated in opinions of Judge Harold Leventhal in
the D.C. Circuit. See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
333. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416.
334. 463 U.S. at 43.
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Professor Cass Sunstein suggests that courts use hard look review, in
part, to assure that agencies allow effective participation in agency
decisionmaking by affected interests.335
When an agency uses social media to evangelize a proposed rule in
a way that suggests that the agency is not interested in receiving or
considering input that varies from the approach taken by the agency
in the proposal, challengers may try to use that as evidence that the
agency is failing to consider an important aspect of the problem, is
considering improper factors as the basis for its rule, or is attempting
to prevent interested persons from participating in the decisionmaking process. A federal district court in Wyoming bought arguments
like those when it ruled in favor of an industry trade group that challenged a National Park Service rule that limited snowmobile use in
various National Parks. 336 The court relied on several statements
made by agency officials during the rulemaking process about the
problems created by snowmobile use in the parks to find that the
Park Service had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by making a predetermined political decision regarding the rule and failing to seriously consider the public comments submitted during the process. 337
Decisions like the Wyoming federal district court decision are,
however, the exception rather than the norm. In most cases, courts
will not invalidate an agency’s rule simply because the agency makes
strong statements supporting the rule during the comment period. As
long as the agency demonstrates in its explanation that it considered
all of the factors and alternatives suggested by the commenters and
required by law, did not consider factors or alternatives which it was
not authorized to consider, and reasonably weighed all of the evidence before it in finalizing its rule, the rule will likely be held valid.
To the extent that the statute under which the agency is promulgating the rule provides it with a range of discretion in making the rule,
courts will not substitute their judgment for the agency if the agency
has adequately explained the reasons for its decision. 338

335. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 177, 181 (1983).
336. See Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 304 F. Supp. 2d. 1278 (D. Wyo. 2004).
337. Id. at 1289-94.
338. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 758-60 (2006). While agencies are frequently motivated by
political considerations in their exercise of discretion, they rarely disclose that as a factor
in their decisionmaking. See generally Stephen M. Johnson, Disclosing the President’s Role
in Rulemaking: A Critique of the Reform Proposals, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1003 (2011). In
most cases, if the agency doesn’t identify political considerations as a factor in its decisionmaking, courts will not reach the conclusion, as the federal district court in Wyoming
did, that the agency was influenced by those factors.
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Nevertheless, if an agency is too aggressive in its social media
campaign during a rulemaking, so that it appears that the agency
has predetermined the outcome of the rulemaking, courts will likely
examine the agency’s consideration of factors and alternatives, and
its explanation for the final rule, much more closely, and may even
require the agency to provide additional justification for its rule before upholding it. 339 Courts may be similarly diligent in their review
of agency rules if it appears that the agency used social networking
to solicit one-sided input in support of the rule (contour the record).340
VII. CONCLUSION
Social networking is ubiquitous in the United States. A 2015 Pew
Research Center study found that almost two-thirds of adults and 90
percent of adults under the age of thirty use social networking
sites. 341 Another Pew survey found that almost two-thirds of Twitter
and Facebook users said that they relied on those social networking
platforms as a news source.342 It is not surprising, therefore, that
government agencies are beginning to incorporate social media tools
into the rulemaking process. As noted above, social networks can
help agencies increase awareness that rules are being proposed, increase transparency in the rulemaking process, and can play some
role in educating the public about the rules, the rulemaking process,
and the issues involved in proposed rules. 343 While agencies have not
yet been able to use social networks to improve the quality of comments or access localized information, it may also be possible for
them to do that through more targeted use of social media tools.344
339. Professor Louis Virelli suggests that courts should review, as part of the hard look
review, the procedures that an agency uses to ensure that the information that it receives
is reliable and the breadth of information that an agency considers in its decisionmaking.
See Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. REV.
721, 745-50 (2014). Although courts have not, in the past, focused on those issues directly
when applying the hard look analysis, if they did, it would be more likely that a court
would find that an agency’s social media campaign that discouraged public input or encouraged one-sided public input was arbitrary or capricious.
340. Using Professor Virelli’s analysis, a court might find that an agency that engages
in information contouring is acting arbitrarily because it is limiting the information that it
receives during the rulemaking process or because it hasn’t taken steps to ensure that the
information is reliable. Id.
341. See Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/
[https://perma.cc/N3ME-SNWU].
342. See Michael Barthee et al., The Evolving Role of News on Twitter and Facebook , P EW R ESEARCH C TR . (July 14, 2015), http://www.journalism.org/2015/07/14/
the-evolving-role-of-news-on-twitter-and-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/B846-S92X].
343. See supra Parts III.A. & B.
344. See supra Part III.C. In its 2013 recommendations, ACUS suggests, “[I]f an agency needs to reach an elusive audience or determine public preferences or reactions in order
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As agencies increasingly use social networking to achieve those goals,
though, they must be careful to avoid using the tools to evangelize their
rules or to contour the record to support their rules. When they engage
in such conduct, they risk having their rules overturned as arbitrary
and capricious or procedurally invalid. In addition, they run the risk of
alienating the public, or segments of the public, who may feel that the
agency is simply using the rulemaking process to build popular support
for the rule or to build a judicially defensible record for an outcome that
was determined before the agency sought public input. In those cases,
the agency risks sacrificing all of the benefits that are normally associated with public participation in a transparent, open rulemaking process, including public support and acceptance for the final rule, ease of
enforcement, and reduced judicial challenges.
Finally, when an agency is using social media to evangelize a rule
or contour the record, it may be tempted to engage in activities that
constitute covert propaganda, self-aggrandizement, or grassroots lobbying, in violation of federal appropriations laws. While the penalties
for those violations are minor, the negative publicity surrounding the
violations can increase opposition to the rule.
For all of those reasons, agencies should follow the guidance of
ACUS and develop a plan for using social media if it will be used in
rulemaking. ACUS recognizes that “social media may not be appropriate and productive in all rulemakings,” but that it can be used “to
supplement or improve the traditional commenting process.” 345
Therefore, ACUS recommends, “Before using social media in connection with a particular rulemaking, agencies should identify the specific goals they expect to achieve through the use of social media and
carefully consider the potential costs and benefits.” 346 Further, ACUS
recommends, “Agencies should use the social media tools that best fit
their particular purposes and goals and should carefully consider
how to effectively integrate those tools into the traditional rulemaking process.” 347 Finally, ACUS recommends that “agencies must
clearly communicate to the public how the social media discussion
will be used in the rulemaking.” 348
The strategic planning and use of social media by the CeRI in its
Regulation Room program is a model for federal agencies.349 EPA’s exto develop an effective regulation, social media may enable the collection of information
and data that are rarely reflected in traditional rulemaking comments.” See ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, supra note 15, at 76,270.
345. Id. at 76,271.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 76,270.
349. See supra notes 164-68, 193-98 and accompanying text.
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perience with the WOTUS rulemaking, on the other hand, demonstrates that the agency must work a little harder to implement ACUS’
recommendations. While EPA has a social media policy, a policy on
using social media to communicate with the public, Facebook guidance, and Twitter guidance, the agency does not have a policy that directly addresses the appropriate use of social media in rulemaking. In
order to use social media effectively and appropriately in the rulemaking process, EPA and federal agencies in general should adopt and utilize policies that implement ACUS’ recommendations before embarking on major social media campaigns in future rulemakings.

